

THE BOOKE OF FREENDESHIP OF
MARCUS TULLIE CICERO.

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TO THE RIGHTE VERTUOUSE, AND MY
SINGULER GOOD LADY, KATHARINE
DUCHESS OF SUFFOLKE.

AS my prisonment and aduersitee, most honorable lady, was of their owne nature ioigned with greate and sundrie miseries, so was the sufferance of the same eased, by the chaunce of diuerse and many commoditees. For thereby founde I greate soule profite, a little minde knowlage, some holow hertes, and a few feithfull freendes. Whereby I tried prisonment of the body, to be the libertee of spirite: aduersitee of fortune: the touche stone of freendship, exempcion from the world, to be a contempt of vanitees: and in the ende quietnes of mind, the occasion of study. And thus somewhat altered, to avoide my olde idelnesse, to recompense my lost time, and to take profite of my calamittee, I gaue my selfe among other thynges to study and learne the Frenche tonge, hauyng both skilful prisoners to enstruct me, and therto plenty of bookes to learne the language. Among whiche as there were dyuerse notable, & for their sondry mattier woorthy readyng, so none liked me above this Tullius booke of freendship, nor for the argument any with it to be compared. The whole wherof whan I had perused, and saw the goodly rules, the naturall order, and ciuile vse of freendship, where before I but liked, than was I rauished, & in a certaine wonder with the heathen lernyng, which chieffy for it selfe I phantasied, & for my state I deemed good to be embraced, as a

glasse to discerne my freendes in, and a ciuile rule to leade my life by.

☞ These causes moued me to thinke it mete for mee. Wherapon I (as I coulde) translated it, and though not so liuely, nor yet so aptly, as some wold loke for, and many culd doe, yet I trust thei will rather beare with my good will, then rebuke my boldnes, for that it proceded more of a good mind than of any presumpcion of knowlage: and so my enterprise is to be interpreted rather by freendes, as a treatise of frendship, then by lerned clerkes in an argument of translacion. Well, how so euer it shalbe liked of the learned, I hope it shalbe allowed of the vnlatined. Whose capacitees by my owne I consider, & for lacke of a fine and flowyng stile, I haue vsed the plaine & common speache, and to thende the sence might not be chaunged, nor the goodnes of the matter by shift of tounses, muche minished, I caused it to be conferred with the latine auctor, & so by the knowen wel lerned to be corrected: after whose handelyng me thought a new spirite and life was geuen it, & many partes semed as it were with a new cote araied, as well for the orderly placynge and eloquently changeyng of some woordes, as also for the plainly openyng and learnedly amending of the sence, whiche in the Frenche translacion was somewhat darkened, and by me for lacke of knowlage in many places missed.

☞ Thus whan the thing was perfected, and I behelde the fame of the auctor, the nature of the treatise, and the clerenesse of his teachyng, I coulde not iudge to whom I shoulde rather offre it, than vnto your grace, whom the freendelesse dayly

find their defence, and the helples repaire to as a refuge. This did I not to teache you, but to let you see in learnyng auncient, that you haue by nature vsed: nor to warne you of ought you lacked, but to sette forth your perfection: the proufe wherof the deade might witnesse, and their ofspring hath iust cause to knowlage it, as mo can record it, then can requite it. And suche your freendly stedfastnesse declared to the deade, doth ascertaine vs of your stedfast frendlinesse toward the liuyng, whiche many haue felt, and diuerse doe proue, and few can want. Of which numbre your grace hath made me one, that neyther leaste nor seldomest, haue tasted of your benefites, both in my trouble and also libertee. Wherfore your grace in my sight is of all other most worthy this smal fruite of my prisons labour, as a fitte patronesse to the honour of such a worke, & a trew example, in whom it is fulfilled. Thus the lord of trueth preserue you in freendship, encrease your frendes, and defend you from enemies.

IOHN HARRYNGTON.

TO THE REDER.

THE wiseman in his prouerbes saieth: A frende loueth at all tymes, that is, as well in the tyme of aduersitee as prosperitee. And agayne he saith, The man that is apt to amitee, and that hath bent his herte to entreteyne freendship, dooeth more loue, & faster sticke to his frend, than one brother to an other. And it is writen in the Ecclesiasticus: Dooe not become a foe of a frend. For suche a man obteyneth an ill name, blameworthy & reprochefull, euen like as the double tonged is infamous. And againe it is there writen, a feithfull & a trusty frende is a stronge garrison: he that atteyneth suche one, fyndeth a precious treasure. To a sure & trusty fiend (saith he) no price is equall. For an assured frende is the medicine of life: Suche a one shall thei obteyne, that reuerently honoure the lorde. He that honoureth the lorde, dooeth stabilishe and make sure this freendship for euen as an other hym selfe shall his frende bee to hym. Forsake not thyne olde frende: for thy new shall not be equall vnto him. A new frende is like vnto must or new wyne: the whiche at lengthe thou shalt drynke with pleasure. A frende (he saith) in prosperitee can not be iudged: nor the ennemie in aduersitee will bee hid. In the tyme of mans prosperitee his ennemies are sory: and in aduersitee his frende forsaketh hym. Shew thy self trusty & sure to thy frende a poore man, that thou maiest with hym reioyce in prosperitee: Obserue fidelitee to hym in tyme of calamitee, that thou mai-

est together with hym come into his possession. See (saith he) that thou loue thy frende: & shew thy selfe sure and trusty vnto hym: And if thou babble abroad his secretes, thou lovest hym. Thus whan I remembre, in howe many places of holy scripture, preceptes are geuen concernyng frendes and frendship: I dooe not a littell muse and meruaile at the diuine geste, that the moste noble and excellent lerned man, the most worthy Romaine Mar. Tul. Cicero had: who in this his booke of Amitee here after folowyng, hath so eloquently, so liuely, so pithyly, and so plainely descriued and set out, what amitee is, how to choose a frende, how muche is to bee doone for a frende, how frendes shuld ponder requestes, what maner of menne are meete for frendship, the propretee of true frendship, the principall cause of frendship, the chief poynt in frendship, the commoditees of frendship, what thyng trieth frendes, the bondes of loue in frendship, the dissimulacion in frendship, feigned frendship, the profite of frendship, the fruite of frendship, the waies to proue frendes, what is to bee attributed to true frendes, what a frende ought to eschew, and so foorth the ende of frendship, that I thynke there is no man, but that he maie learne out of the saide booke all the poyntes needefull for hym, that will entre into, & continue in that most happy and blissefull life of true frendship; wherby he maie so order and gouerne hym selfe, that at length he maie atteyne to that glorious name, to bee called a sure & a trusty frende. And certaynely no man can clyme so high

(by the descripcion of Tully) but he that is both
good and wise, and that liueth vertuously. And
so, after the determinacion of Cicero, I maie con-
clude, that he that is a feithfull,
a sure, and a trusty freende,
muste needes bee a
good, a wise and
a vertuous
man.



M. TULLI CICERONIS LAELIUS DE AMICITIA LIBER AD T. POMPONIUM ATTICUM.

ARGUMENTUM.

Cum inter P. Scipionem Africanum et C. Laelium summam semper amicitiam fuisse constaret, Ciceroni, cum vellet aliquid de amicitia conscribere, Laeli persona idonea visa est, quem induceret de amicitia disputantem cum utroque genere, C. Fannio et Q. Mucio Scaevola. Hoc igitur Sermone, quem Cicero paucis diebus post mortem Africani anno p. u. c. 625, ante Chr. nat. anno 129, habitum fingit, praemisso prooemio Laelius docet, quid sit amicitia, quibus de causis amici quaerantur, quibus causis amicitia contrahatur, deinde inter quos amicitia esse possit, quae sit amicitiae lex, quae officia, quibus denique modis perpetuo conservetur.

M. TULLI CICERONIS LAELIUS
DE AMICITIA LIBER AD T. POM-
PONIUM ATTICUM.

Q MUCIUS augur multa narrare de
Q. C. Laelio socero suo memoriter et iu-
cunde solebat nec dubitare illum in om-
ni sermone appellare sapientem; ego au-
tem a patre ita eram deductus ad Scaevo-
lam sumpta virili toga, ut, quoad possem
et liceret, a senis latere numquam disce-
derem; itaque multa ab eo prudenter dis-
putata, multa etiam breviter et commode
dicta memoriae mandabam fierique stu-
debam eius prudentia doctior. Quo mor-
tuo me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli,
quem unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et
iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere.
Sed de hoc alias; nunc redeo ad augurem.
Cum saepe multa, tum meminì domi
in hemicyclio sedentem, ut solebat, cum
et ego essem una et pauci admodum fām-
iliares, in eum sermonem illum incidere,
qui tum forte multis erat in ore. Memini-
sti enim profecto, Attice, et eo magis, quod
P. Sulpicio utebare multum, cum is tri-
bunus pl. capitali odio a Q. Pompeio, qui
tum erat consul, dissideret, quocum
coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat,
quanta esset hominum vel admiratio vel
querella. Itaque tum Scaevola cum in
eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, expo-
suit nobis sermonem Laeli de amicitia
habitum ab illo secum et cum altero gen-

Laelius,
father in
law to
Scaevola
the Aug-
ur and to
Fannius
Pom.
Atticus

P. Sul-
pitius
Tribune
Q. Pom-
peius
Consull

THE BOOKE OF FREENDSHIP
OF MARCUS TULLIE
CICERO.

QUINTUS Mutius Scæuola Augur was wont to tell redily and pleasantlie many thynges of Caius Lælius his fãther in law, and not to sticke in al his kynde of comunicacion to call him wise. But I was so put to Scæuola by my fãther, whan I came to mans state, that as nigh as I wel could or might, I shoulde neuer goe from the olde mans sleue. And therfore I bare away many thynges wysely reasoned, and many thinges brieffy and handsomly told, and sought by his wisdom to growe better learned. When he was dead, I gat me to P. Scæuola, whom alone I dare boldly name the chefest of our citee for witte and knowlage, but an other time we shal speake of him, now I retourn to Scæuola Augur. As he often talked of sundrie matters, so I remembre, sittying at home in his half round chayre (as his maner was) when I and very fẽwe his familiars were presente, he fell into that talke, which then was almost common in many mens mouthes. For you remembre (as I thinke) Atticus (and so mucche the rather,) because you haunted Sulpitius companie very mucche, what a wonder of lamentacion of men there was, when he beyng Tribune of the people, disagreed from Q. Pompeius with a deadlie fõode, who then was Consul, with whom very friendly and louynglie he had liued. Therfore at that tyme Scæuola, when he fell in a rehersal therof, declared vnto vs the talke that Lælius had vpon friendship wyth hym

nero, C. Fannio Marci filio, paucis diebus post mortem Africani. Eius disputationis sententias memoriae mandavi, quas hoc libro exposui arbitrato meo; quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne 'inquam' et 'inquit' saepius interponeatur, atque ut tamquam a praesentibus coram haberi sermo videretur.

¶ Cum enim saepe mecum ageres, ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi res cum omnium cognitione, tum nostra familiaritate visa est. Itaque feci non invitatus, ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. Sed ut in Catone Maiore, qui est scriptus ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur aptior persona, quae de illa aetate loqueretur, quam eius, qui et diutissime senex fuisset et in ipsa senectute praeter ceteros floruisse, sic, cum accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laeli et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Laeli persona visa est, quae de amicitia ea ipsa disserteret, quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaevola. Genus autem hoc sermonum positum in hominum veterum auctoritate, et eorum inlustrium, plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis; itaque ipse mea legens sic adficio inter dum, ut Catonem, non me loqui existimem. Sed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia. Tum

Cato the elder

The friendship between C. Laelius and Scipio

The authority of

and his other sonne in lawe C. Fannius, the sonne of Marcus, shortly after Affricanes death. The summe of whiche disputacion I bare awaie, and have set it forth in this booke after my owne phantasie. For I haue brought in as it were themselves speakyng, to the entent, these woordes quod I, and quod he, should not be to often rehersed. And the rather I dyd it, that the talke might seeme of two that were present before you. For where as often times ye wer in hand with me Atticus, that I shulde write somewhat vpon freendshippe, me thought it a thyng both meete for the knowlage of al men, and also for our familiaritee. And therefore at your request I dyd it, not vnwillynglie, that I might profit many. But as in my booke called Cato Maior, whiche is written to you of olde age, I haue brought in Cato the olde man reasonyng, for that there seemed no meter man to speke of age then he, who had been very long aged, & above others in that his age had fforished: so for as muche as we haue vnderstand by our elders the notable acquaintance betwene C. Lælius & P. Scipio, I haue thought Lælius a very fitte person, to reason the self same thinges of frendship, whiche my maister Scæuola remembred, was often disputed by hym. And certes this kynd of talke, set out with the auctoritee of ancient men, & the same famous, seemeth I wot not howe to haue in it a more weightinesse & grauitee. And therefore I my self readyng mine own workes, sometime am in that moode, that me thinketh Cato speketh and not I. But as then age with age did speake of age, so now to his freend the freendly writeth of frendship. Then spake Cato

est Cato locutus, quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior; nunc Laelius et sapiens (sic enim est habitus) et amicitiae gloria excellens de amicitia loquetur. Tu velim a me animum parumper avertas, Laelium loqui ipsum putes. C. Fannius et Q. Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani; ab his sermo oritur, respondet Laelius, cuius tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens te ipse cognosces.

auncient
noble-
men

Fannius. Sunt ista, Laeli; nec enim melior vir fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior. Sed existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse coniectos unum; te sapientem et appellant et existimant. Tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni, scimus L. Acilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse sapientem, sed uterque alio quodam modo, Acilius, quia prudens esse in iure civili putabatur, Cato, quia multarum rerum usum habebat; multa eius et in senatu et in foro vel provisa prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur; propterea quasi cognomen iam habebat in senectute sapientis. Te autem alio quodam modo non solum natura et moribus, verum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem, nec sicut vulgus, sed ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem, qualem in reliqua Graecia neminem (nam qui septem appellantur, eos, qui ista subtilius quaerunt, in numero sapientium non habent),

L. Acili-
us

Seven
sages of
Grece

at those dayes, in a maner the eldest and wisest. Now spebeth Lælius of frendship, a man both wyse (for so was he counted) and for the prayse of frendship the chiefest.

☞ I woulde for a whyle you mynded not me, but suppose that Lælius him self speaketh. C. Fannius, and Q. Mutius cometh to their father in lawe after Affricanes death, the talke ryseth on them. Lælius maketh answere. Whose disputacion is whole of frendship, whiche your selfe (when you reade) shall vnderstand.

Fann. These thynges be true O Læli, for neyther better, neither nobler hath there been any then Affricanus. But you muste thinke all men haue cast their eyes vpon you, and you onely they call and iudge wyse. This name was geuen not longe sence to M. Cato. We knowe also, that L. Acilius in our fathers tyme was named wyse. But either of them in a shier maner. Acilius, because he was thought connyng in the Ciuile lawe: Cato, because he had experience of many thinges, and many of his dooeynges, bothe in counsayle in the Senate, and in the iudgement place of Justice, were reported to be foreseen wisely, doen stoutly, and answered wittilie: atteigned now in his olde age (as half a surname) to be called Cato the wyse. But you in an other kynde, not only by nature & condicions, but also by studie and knowlage, they accompte wyse. Nether after the comon peoples reckenyng, but as the learned sorte are wonte to cal one wyse, that is suche a one, as in al the rest of Grece is not the lyke. For those, which narowlie searche out these matters, doe not reken them in

Athenis unum accepimus, et eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum iudicatum; hanc esse in te sapientiam existumant, ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanosque casus virtute inferiores putes. Itaque ex me quaerunt, credo ex hoc item Scaevola, quoniam pacto mortem Africani feras, eoque magis, quod proximis Nonis cum in hortos D. Bruti auguris commentandi causa, ut adsolet, venissemus, tu non adfueristi, qui diligentissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.

Socrates
iudged
most
wise by
Apollo

Scaevola. Quaerunt quidem, C. Laeli, multi, ut est a Fannio dictum, sed ego id respondeo, quod animum adverti, te dolorem, quem acceperis cum summi viri, tum amicissimi morte, ferre moderate nec potuisse non commoveri nec fuisse id humanitatis tuae; quod autem Nonis in conlegio nostro non adfuisses, valitudinem respondeo causam, non maestitiam fuisse.

Laelius. Recte tu quidem, Scaevola, et vere; nec enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi, cum valerem, abduci incommodo meo debui, nec ullo casu arbitror hoc constanti homini posse contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat officii. Tu autem, Fanni, quod mihi tantum tribui dicis, quantum ego nec adgnosco nec postulo, facis amice; sed, ut mihi videris, non recte iudicas de Catone; aut

Constant
men

the numbre of wyse men, which be called the seuen sages of Grece. In dede one we haue heard of, that was at Athenes, and the same Apolloes oracle adiudged the wysest. This wisdom men thinke in you, that you accompt all your riches lodged within you, and that all worldlie happes be inferiours to vertue. And for this cause (I beleue) they enquire of me, and of Scæuola here also, howe you beare Affricanes deathe, and so muche the rather, because these last nonas, when we came into D. Brutus orchardes the Augur, (as the vsage is) to reason vpon matters, you wer not present there, who was woonte moste diligently to attend both that day and businesse.

Scæ. Many truely aske, Caius Lælie, as Fannius saieth. But I make this aunswere, that I perceiue, you beare your sorowe sobrelie, whiche you take for so noble and freendly a man, & that you coulde not choose, but be somewhat troubled, and otherwyse of your owne naturall kindenesse ye could not be. And as to that you were not presente at our meetyng these nones, I saied, sickenesse was the cause, and not sorowe.

Læ. Well saied Scæuola and truely: for reither oughte I for any losse to be withdrawen from this dutie, whiche whyle I was in healthe, I alwaies perfourmed: neither dooe I thynke, that it can happen by any occasion, that there shoulde be anie slackennesse of duitie in a constant manne. But you Fannie, dooe lyke a freende, that you tell me, the worlde ascribeth so muche vnto me as neyther I acknowelage, neyther desire: but yet as me seemeth, you iudge not truelye of Cato: for eyther

enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut, si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. Quo modo, ut alia omittam, mortem filii tulit! memineram Paulum, videram Galum, sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque loquar, sic habetote:

☞ Ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem quam id recte faciam, viderint sapientes; sed certe mentiar. Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitror, nemo umquam erit, ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit; sed non egeo medicina, me ipse consolor, et maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo, quo amicorum decessu plerique angis solent. Nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto, mihi accidit, si quid accidit; suis autem incommodis graviter angere non amicum, sed se ipsum amantis est. Cum illo vero quis neget actum esse praeclare? Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, immortalitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est, quod homini fas esset optare? qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit, qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus consul est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae

Cato
recken-
ed wise
if any be
wise

Socrates
for his
saynges,
Cato for
his dedes
com-
mended
Scipio
com-
mended

Selfe
loue

Scipio
twise
consull

no manne there is (as in deede I rather beleue) or if anie bee, Cato it is that is wyse. Ah howe (to leaue the reste vnspoken) dyd he take the death of his sonne? I can remembre Paulus, & saw Caius. But these may not be compared to Cato, the great & the noble. Wherefore beware, howe you prefer any before Cato, no not hym, whom Apollo (as you saied) adiudged the wysest, for of this man his dedes, & of that man his saynges be commended. But concerning my selfe (to answere now you bothe) reaken thus. If I denie to be griued with the losse of Scipio, lette the wyse iudge, howe well it were dooen: but certes lye I shoulde, for I am troubled, that I am nowe bireft of such a freend as I suppose neuer none shalbe, and as I can approue, neuer none hath been. But I nede no phisicke, I can comforte my selfe, & chieffly with this kynde of comfort, that I am not in that errour, wherwith moste men are woont to be accombred, at the departing of their frendes. For I think that Scipio hath no hurte, mine it is, if any be, And for a man to be greuously troubled for his owne losses, it is selffy loue, & not frendly loue. But who can denie, that Scipio is not happie? for except he woulde haue wysshed euer lyfe, (whiche was farthest out of his thought) what hath he not obtained, that was mete for a man to wishe? who in the beginnyng of this mannes state, with unheard vertues, exceded the great hope the citesins conceived of him, beyng a chylde, who neuer sued for the Consulship, & yet wastwise made Consull: first before tyme, beeyng vnder age: secondlie in tyme by course, & for the

paene sero, qui quabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia, verum etiam futura bella deleuit. Quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sonores, bonitates in suos, iustitia in omnes? nota sunt vobis. Quam autem civitati carus fuerit, maerore funeris indicatum est. Quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio iuvare potuisset? Senectus enim quamvis non sit gravis, ut memini Catonem anno ante, quam est mortuus, mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen aufert eam viriditatem, in qua etiam nunc erat Scipio. Quam ob rem vita quidem talis fuit vel fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere, moriendi autem sensum celeritas abstulit; quod de genere mortis difficile dictu est, quid homines suspicentur, videtis; hoc vere tamen licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex multis diebus, quos in vita celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, quomodo senatu dimisso domum reductus ad vesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e vita, ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius quam ad inferos pervenisse.

Neque enim adsentior iis, qui haec nuper disserere coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire atque omnia morte deleri; plus apud me antiquorum

All Rome
bewailed
Scipioes
death

Olde age

Howe
honor-
ably
Sci. was
brought
from the
Senate
house

Immor-
talitee of
the soule

common wealth almost to late: who by destroy-
yng two cities, moste egar enemies to this Empire,
clerely brake vp not onely warres, that were pre-
sent, but warres whiche were to come. What should
I speak of his gentle maners, his naturall dutie to-
wardes his mother, his liberalitie towardes his
sisters, his goodnesse towardes his seruantes, his
vprightnes towardes all men? All these be righte
wel knownen to you. But how deare he was to the
citee, it was declared by the mourning at his fū-
neralles. What then could hauyng of a fēwe yeres
moe, haue profited hym? for old age, although it
be no heauie burden (as I remembre Cato did the
yere before his death discourse with me and Scip.)
yet it taketh away that fřeshe youth wherein then
Scip. was. Wherfore his life was suche, either by
fortune, or by glorie, as nothyng coulde bee added
more. But his quicke departure, toke awaie the
greefe of death, of the which sort of dyng, it is
hard to speake any certaintee. What menne sus-
pecte, you see. Neuertheless, this a manne maie
safely saie, that amongst many his daies, which
he had seen in his lyfe tyme most faire and ioye-
full, that daie was the noblest to P. Scipio, when
the Senate house beyng broken vp, he was brought
home again at nyghte, by the eldest Senatoures,
by the league fřeendes of the Romaines, & also by
the Latines, the daie before he departed this lyfe,
that fřom so high a step of honour, he might seme
rather to haue mounted to God, then to haue gone
doun to hell. Fř I can in no wyse agree with them,
whiche began of late to reason thus, that the soule
dieth with the body, and al thinges end by death.

auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum maiorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, vel eorum, qui in hac terra fuerunt magnamque Graeciam, quae nunc quidem, deleta est, tum florebat, institutis et praeceptis suis erudierunt, vel eius, qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, qui non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper, animos hominum esse divinos, iisque, cum ex corpore excessissent, reditum in caelum patere, optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum. Quod idem Scipioni videbatur, qui quidem, quasi praesagiret, per paucis ante mortem diebus, cum et Philus et Manilius adesset et alii plures, tuque etiam, Scaevola, mecum venisses, triduum disseruit de re publica; cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de immortalitate animorum, quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse dicebat. Id si ita est, ut optumi cuiusque animus in morte facillime evolet tamquam e custodia vinculisque corporis, cui censemur cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? Quocirca maerere hoc eius eventu vereor ne invidi magis quam amici sit. Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali; sensu enim amisso fit idem, quasi

The part
of Italie
nowe
called
Calabrie
in the
kyng-
dome of
Naples

Socra.

Mannes
soule

Phi. Ma-
nilius

I waie more the auctoritee of olde writers, & of our elders, which made so godly lawes for the deade, as in mine opinion they wold neuer haue dooen, if they had thought there hadde nothyng concerned them. And their auctoritee also I more regarde, which were sometye here in this land, and instructed great Grece with their good rules and lessons, whiche now is destroyed, & at that tyme flourishshed. And his also I esteeme more, whiche by Appolloes oracle was adiudged the wisest, who did not affirm somtyme one thyng, and somtyme an other, as in many cases is vsed, but alwaies helde one, that mans sowle was an heauenlie thyng: and that the same, when it departed from the bodie, had a waie to retourne to heauen very spedie, for euery good & iuste man. Whiche self same thyng Scipio also thought, who seemed as it were to haue a foreteling of the thyng, a verie fewe daies before his death, when both Philus and Manilius beyng present, and others moe: yea, and you your selfe Scæuola, comoned with me, he reasoned three whole dayes vpon a comon wealth, the latter ende of the whiche disputacion, was of the euerlastyng lyfe of the soule, which (he said) he heard of Affricanus in his slepe by a vision. If that be so, that euery good mans soule doth easily make his flight to heauen, as out of prison and cheines of the bodie, whom can we iudge to haue had an easier passage to God, then Scipio? Wherfore to lament this his good end, I feare were rather enuious then freendly. And on thother side, if I were afearde of this, that the soule died with the bodie, & that there remained neyther feltyng of weale nor woe: then

natus non esset omnino, quem tamen
essenatum et nos gaudemus et haec civi-
tas, dum erit, laetabitur. Quam ob rem
cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum
optime est, mecum incommodius, quem
fuerat acquius, ut prius introieram, sic
prius exire de vita. Sed tamen recorda-
tione nostrae amicitiae sic fruor, ut beate
vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vix-
erim, quocum mihi coniuncta cura de
publica re et de privata fuit, quocum et
domus fuit et militia communis et, id in
quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum,
studiorum, sententiarum summa con-
sensus. Itaque non tam ista me sapien-
tiae, quam modo Fannius commemora-
vit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam
quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam spero
sempiternam fore, idque eo mihi magis
est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis vix
tria aut quattuor nominantur paria ami-
corum; quo in genere sperare videor
Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam pos-
teritati fore.

Freende
ship

Scase
thre or
fowre
couples
of
freendes

Fannius. Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse
est. Sed quoniam amicitiae mentionem
fecisti et sumus otiosi, pergratum mihi
feceris, spero item Scaevolae, si, quem
ad modum soles de ceteris rebus, quom
ex te quaeruntur, sic de amicitia dispu-
taris quid sentias, qualem existumes,
quae praecepta des.

Scaevola. Mihi vero erit gratum; atque

as in deathe there is no goodnes, so neither is there euellnesse. For whan a mans fēling is once gon, he is made as though he had neuer ben born: yet that Sci. was begot, both we dooe reioyse, and the citee (while it standes,) ought to be glad. Wherfore, as I said afore, he is verie well, but with me it is somewhat wurse, whom reason rather woulde, as I came beefore hym into this worlde, so I should haue gone beefore him out of this life: but yet I take such fruite of the remembraunce of our frendship, that I thinke I lyued happilie, that with Scipio I ledde my lyfe, with whom I had a ioynct care, for the common wealthe, and for our priuate causes with whom bothe in peace & warre I tooke lyke parte: yea, and wee agreed euermore in loue, mynde, pourpose, & opinion, in whiche thyng the whole pithe of frendship standeth. Therfore this fame of wysdom, which Fannius euen now rehearsed, doeth not so greatly delighte me (specially beyng false) as that I trust there shalbe an euerlastyng memorie of our frendship: & the same the rather is an heartioye vnto me, because that in so many hundred yeares, as haue passed, there haue be founde skace three or fowre couples of freendes, amonge the whiche sorte I see there is hope, that Scipioes and Lælius frendship shall be knowne to our ofspring.

Fan. Verely Laelie, this can not otherwyse be chosen. But seeyng you haue mencion of frendship, and we be also at leasure, you shall dooe a great pleasure to me, & no lesse I trust to Scæuola, if as ye are wont of other matters, when they are demaunded of you, you wil so now dispute of frendship, what you thinke thereof, whom you counte a freende, and what good rules you geue thereon.

id ipsum cum tecum agere conarer, Fannius antevortit. Quam ob rem utrique nostrum gratum admodum feceris.

Laelius. Ego vero non graverer, si mihi ipse confiderem; nam et praeclara res est et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi. Sed quis ego sum? aut quae est in me facultas? doctorum est ista consuetudo, eaque Graecorum, ut iis ponatur, de quo disputent quamvis subito; magnum opus est egetque exercitatione non parva. Quam ob rem, quae disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis, qui ista profitentur; ego vos hortari tantum possum, ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas. Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse; neque id ad vivum rescio, ut illi, qui haec, subtilius disserunt fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem parum; negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane; sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus, nos autem ea, quae sunt in usu vitaeque communi, non ea, quae finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus. Numquam ego dicam C. Fabricium, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanum, quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes. Quare sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et invidiosum et obscurum, con-

Frende-
ship to
be pre-
ferred a-
bove all
thyng
Frende-
ship on-
ely be-
twene
good
men

C.Fabri.
Mar.Cu.
T. Cor-
nucanus

Scæuo. It pleseth me wel, and as I was about to be in hand with you for it, Fannius did forespeke me. Wherefore you shall exceedynglie pleasure bothe vs.

Læ1. And I surelie thynke it no payne, if I thought my self well able, for both the matter seemes goodlie, & we (as Fannius alledged) be at leasure. But who am I? or what eloquence is in me? This is the facion of lerned men, & that amonge the Greekes, to haue a matter proponed vnto them, whereon they shoulde reason, although out of hand. It is a buisie peece of worke, and needeth no small exercise. Wherefore my iudgement is, you shoulde seake the poyntes to be disputed of freendeship, of those, which professe this maner of reasonyng. As for me I can no more but exhort you, to sette freendship beefore all kynde of worldely thynges. For nothyng is so agreable to nature, nor so fitte for prosperitee or aduersitee. But firste and foremost this I thinke, that frendshippe can bee but in good men.

☞ Neither do I so search the mater to the quicke, as they which reason this geare more subtillie, although perchaunce truely, and yet little to any comon profite. For they denie, that any is good, but he bee wyse. And be it so hardily. Yet suche a thyng call they that wysedome, as neuer earthely man atteigned hytherto. But we muste hope for suche thynges as bee in vse, and in our daiely life, and not for those thynges, which be feigned or wished after. I will neuer saie, that Caius Fabritius, Mar. Curius, and Titus Cornucanus, whom our elders deemed wyse, were after these mennes rule accompted wyse. Wherefore let them keepe to them selues their name of wisdom, bothe enuied

cedant, ut viri boni fuerint. Ne id quidem facient, negabunt id nisi sapienti posse concedi. Agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva. Qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides, integritas, acquitas, liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas, libido, audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ii fuerunt, modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putamus, quia sequantur, quantum homines possunt, naturam optimam benevivendi ducem. Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos, ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam, maior autem, ut quisque proxume accederet. Itaque cives potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit; sed ea non satis habet firmitatis. Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benivolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benivolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet. Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est ed adducta in angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.

☞ Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benivolentia et caritate con-

Pro-
verbs

Good
men

The order
of
friend-
ship

What a-
mities is

and vnknownen, so thei confesse these afore were good men: but yet that wyll not they graunt, for they will denie, that that can bee saied but by them that be wyse. Let vs goe then euen plainlie to woorke lyke a packe staffe, as the prouerbe is. They whiche behaue themselues, and doe so liue, that their faïeth, their honestee, their vprightnesse and liberalitee is allowed, and in them neither couetousnesse, neither trecherie, neither rashnesse is seen to be: and besyde this, be of great constancie, as they wer, whom before we named: all these lyke as they bee taken for good men, so we thinke them worthie to be called, who folow nature, the best guide of welliuyng, so far as mans power can leade them. For this me thinkth I do spie, that we are so borne together, as there shoulde be among all men a certain fellowship. And the greater the fellowship shuld be, the nearer that euerie one cometh to another. And therefore citesins be derer to vs then forrains, & kinsfolke nerer then frennefolke: for towarde these Nature her selfe hath bredde a freendelinesse: but in this there is not suretee ynough, for in this point frendshippe passeth kinred, in that kinred maie be without good will: but frendship in no wise can lacke it. For take awaie good wil, & frendship leseth, but cosinage keepeth styll his name. But how great the vertue of frendship is, it may here of best be vnderstand, that of innumerable compaignies of mankinde, whiche nature her self hath knitte together, it is a thyng drawen and broughte into such a streight, that frendship is alwaies ioigned either betweene twoo, or els betwene fewe. For frendshippe is nothyng else, but a perfect agreement with good will and true loue in al kind of good thinges and god-

sensio; qua quidem haut scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum. Divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii valitudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates. Beluarum hoc quidem extremum, illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam in fortunae temeritate. Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest. Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur virosque bonos eos, qui habentur, numeremus, Paulos, Catones, Galos, Scipiones, Philos; his communis vita contenta est; eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur. Talis igitur inter viros amicitia tantas oportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. Principio qui potest esse vita 'vitalis', ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benivolentia conquiescit? Quid dulcius quam habere, quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? Qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes, qui illis aequae ac tu ipse gauderet? adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret. Denique ceterae res, quae expetuntur, opportunaesunt singulae rebus fere singulis, divi-

Plesure

No
friend-
ship
without
virtue

Commo-
dittees of
friend-
ship

lie. And I knowe not whether any better thyng hath been geuen of GOD vnto men, wisdom excepted, then this same freendship. Some set riches before, some health, others power, and others honour, many also pleasures. But certes this last is for beastes, and those other yppermore be fading and vncertain, and bee not so muche within the compasse of our wysdom, as within the ficklenes of fortune. But they, whiche place our cheefest weale in vertue, doe therin very well: and yet this same vertue it is, whiche both engendreth and vpholdeth freendship. Neither maie freendship by any meanes bee without vertue. Nowe let vs set out, what is vertue, after the maner of our liuyng, and facion of our talke: and let vs not measure it as certeyn vlearned men dooe, by the statelinesse of the woordes. And let vs reken them good men, whiche are so counted, that is to saie, the Paules, the Catoes, the Caians, the Scipioes, and Philons. These were contented with this common kind of lyfe. And as for suche, which can not any where be founde, let vs leaue theim of. Therefore among suche sort of men, freendship hath so many commoditees, as I can scacely wel expresse. First who can be *vita vitalis* (to vse Ennius termes) whiche in englishe is, liuyng in this lyfe, that liueth not in mutual loue with some freend? What sweeter thyng can there be, than to haue one, with whom thou darrest so boldly talke all mattiers, as with thine owne selfe: how shoulde the profit of welfare, and prosperitee be so great, if you had not some, which should reioise so muche therat as your self? But as for euil plight and aduersitee, it were harde to beare them without such an one, as wold beare the same more greuously than your self. To conclude, all other thynges, that are desired, each one to each man serueth the tourne,

tiae, ut utare, opes, ut colare, honores, ut laudare, voluptates, ut gaudeas, valitudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis; amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris, praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam in-tempestiva, numquam molesta est; itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia. Neque ego nunc de vulgari aut de mediocri, quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit. Nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.

Friendship is as necessary as the elements

Quomque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bonam spem praelucet in posterum nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. Verum enim amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et imbecilli valent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt; tantum eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum. Ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. Quod si exemeris ex rerum natura benivolentiae conjunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri quidem cultus permanebit. Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae con-

The excellencie of amitie

Want of friendship

as riches for vse, wealth for worship, honoure for praise, pleasure for delite, health to want greife, and to dooe the office of the bodie. Freendship conteigneth more thynges in it. Whither so euer you tourne, it is at hand, it will be kept out of no place, it is never vnseasonable, nor never troublous. Therfore neither water, nor fier, ne aire, as thei say, do we in more places vse, then this frendship. And now doe I not speake of the common or meane sorte of freendship (which yet deliteth and profiteth) but of the true & perfecte, as theirs was, whiche beeyng fewe are soone tolde. For frendship maketh welfare the goodlier, and euill fare, by sondering and partyng of greefes, the lighter.

☞ And where freendshippe hath in it manie and greate commoditees, yet this exceedeth al the rest, that she forecomfortes vs, with the good hope that is to come. She suffreth mens hertes neither to feint, nor yet to fall: but he that beholdeth his friend, doeth as it wer behold a certain patterne of him selfe. Wherfore in frendship the absent be present, the nedie neuer lacke, the sicke thynke them selues whole, and that which is hardest to be spoken, the dead never dye. So great honour, remembraunce, & desire breedeth in them towarde their freendes. By reason wherof their dethes be thought happie, and the others lifes be muche preisid. But if you shoulde take out of the worlde the knot of freendship, neither can there any house, neither any citie be able to continue, no not the tillage of the land can endure. And if this can not be vnderstand herebi, yet of strife and debate

cordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque ex discordiis perspici potest. Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit averti? Ex quo, quantum boni sit in amicitia, iudicari potest. Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent, quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. Itaque, si quando aliquod officium extitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est, qui id non maximis efferat laudibus? Qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitis et amici mei M. Pacuvi nova fabula! cum ignorante rege, uter Orestes esset, Pylades Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret. Stantes plaudebant in refecta; quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse? Facile indicabit ipsa natura vim suam, cum homines, quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent.

☞ Hactenus mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem potuisse dicere; si quae praeterea sunt (credo autem esse multa), ab iis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant, quaeritote.

Fannius. Nos autem a te potius; quam~

it maie wel be perceiued, howe great the power of concorde and freendship is. For what howse so stedie, or what citie standes so fāste, but thorough hatered & strife, it may be vtterlie ouerthrowen? Wherypon, how much goodnesse resteth in freendshippe, it maie be easily iudged. Men report, that a certein Agrigentine, beeyng a learned manne wrote in Greke verses, that al thynges, hauyng their beyng in the world and mouyng, be by freendship kept together, and by debate skattered: and this all menne bothe perceiue, and proue in very deede. And therfore if at any tyme, there hath appeared, any kynde parte of one freend toward an other, in aduenturyng of parell, or else in part bearyng the same, what is he that would not set it out with great preyses? What a great show was there, the last daie all the place ouer, at the newe made plaie of mine olde hoste and freend M. Pacuuius, when the kynge, not knowing whether of the two was Orestes, Pylades answered, that he it was, that was Orestes, because he woulde haue been put to death for him: and Orestes again, that was so in deede, auowed stiffely, that he it was that was Orestes. The herers that stode aboute, preised it with clapping their handes, beyng but a matter feigned. What thinke we then thei would haue dooen in a true matter? Here nature her selfe did soone bewraie her own earnestnesse, when these men iudged the same to be well dooen in another, which they could not doe them selves. And thus fārre me seemeth, I haue thoroughly spoken what I thynke of freendshippe, if there be any more thynges, as A beleue there be many, aske it of them if ye thinke good, whiche dispute these kynd of matters.

Fan. But we rather couet to heare it of you, al-

quam etiam ab istis saepe quaesivi et audiui non invitus equidem; sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae.

Scaevola. Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis, cum est de re publica disputatum, adfuisses. Qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!

Fannius. Facile id quidem fuit, iustissimo viro defendere.

Scaevola. Quid? amicitiam nonne facile ei, qui ob eam summa fide, constantia iustitiaque servatam maxumam gloriam ceperit?

Laelius. Vim hoc quidem est adferre. Quid enim refert, qua me ratione cogatis? cogitis certe. Studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est, tum ne aequum quidem obistere.

☞ Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter inbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benivolentiam coniungendam. Nam utilitates quidem eti-

though for my part I oft tymes haue soughte it at their handes, and haue hearde theim very wyll~ynglie: but we looke for an other manner of veine in your talke.

Scæ. You woulde the sooner have saied so Fannie, if you had of late been present in Scipioes orcharde, when the reasonyng was concernyng a common wealth, and had heard, what a defender of iustice he was at that day, against a curiouse oracion that Philus made.

Fan. That surely was an easie matter for the iust to defend iustice.

Scæ. And what saie you by freendship? shall it not be lyke easie for him to do the same therein, who hath gained great honour, for keepyng the same with all trustinesse, stedfastnesse, and vprightnesse.

Læel. Naie, this is as though ye would force me to speake. But what skilleth it, by what meanes you driue me to it, I take it truely, that ye force me. Yet to withstande the earnest desires of a mans freendes, especially in an honeste matter, partlie it is an harde thyng to doe, & partly not well standyng with reason. Wherfore many times thinkyng of freendshippe, this was woont to be chiefly weighed of me, whether for state and for neede, menne ought to seeke for freendship, to thentent that in doyng and takyng of pleasures, one mighte receiue of another, that he cold not come to by him selfe, & after that sorte mighte requite others: and whether this were the very propertee of freendship, or elles there were some other cause more ancient, more commendable, and more proceding of nature. For loue, wherof freendly love and freendshippe commeth, is the chiefe cause, to fasten good willes together. Commodities often times also bee

am ab iis percipiuntur saepe, qui simu- **Wher-**
 latione amicitiae coluntur et observan- **fore**
 tur temporis causa, in amicitia autem ni- **freendes**
 hil fictum est, nihil simulatum et, quid- **are**
 quid est, id est verum et voluntarium. **sought**
 Quapropter a natura mihi videtur poti- **Loue**
 usquam ab indigentia orta amicitia, ad-
 plicatione magis animi cum quodam
 sensu amandi quam cogitatione, quan-
 tum illa res utilitatis esset habitura.
 Quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis **Natural**
 quibusdam animadverti potest, quae ex **freend-**
 se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus **ship**
 et ab eis ita amantur, ut facile earum sen-
 sus appareat. Quod in homine multo est
 evidentius, primum ex ea caritate, quae
 est inter natos et parentes, quae dirimi
 nisi detestabili scelere non potest; de-
 inde cum similis sensus extitit amoris,
 si aliquem nacti sumus, cuius cum mo-
 ribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo
 quasi, lumen aliquod probitatis et vir-
 tutis perspicere videamur. Nihil est en- **Vertue**
 im virtute amabilius, nihil, quod magis
 adluciat ad diligendum, quippe cum
 propter virtutem et probitatem etiam
 eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam
 modo diligamus. Quis est, qui C. Fab- **C. Fab-**
 rici, M'. Curi non cum caritate aliqua **ritius. M.**
 benivolam memoriam usurpet, quos num- **Curius**
 quam viderit? quis autem est, qui Tar-
 quinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium,

gotten at their handes, whiche with flatteryng
fřenship be soughte vpon, and as tyme serueth, be
attended vpon. But in fřendshippe there is no
fāining, there is no dissembling, and what so euer
is in it, the same is true and vnforced. Wherefore I
am of opinion, that fřeendship toke his begyn-
yng rather by nature, then for any help of staie,
and rather by the castyng of ones phantasie to-
ward thother, with a certein fēlyng of loue, then
by the thinkyng, howe muche profite might en-
sue of suche a thyng. The which surely what
kinde of thyng it is, maie wel be vnderstande, euen
in certeine beastes, whiche so tenderlie loue their
yong ones for a certayne space, and be so loved of
them again, that their nature soone appeareth:
whiche thyng in man is muche more eident.

☞ First of the loue that is beetwene the children
and parentes, whiche can not possibly without
some heinouse mischiefe be withdrawen. And se-
condarily when a lyke bearyng of loue appeareth,
as if we have found any body, with whose maners
and nature we agree, because we thinke we see in
them as it were a certeine sparke of honestie and
vertue. For nothing is better beloued than vertue,
nor nothyng more allureth men to cast fāuour, in
so muche, that for vertue and honestie we fāuour,
after a certeine sorte euen those, whom we neuer
sawe in our life. For who is it, that doeth not vse
remembraunce of Caius Fabritius, or Marcus
Curius, whom he neuer saw, with a certaigne loue
and good fāuour toward them. Who again doeth
not hate Tarquinius the proude, Sp. Cassius, and

Sp. Maelium non oderit? Cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit. ☞ Quod si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis, quos numquam vidimus, vel, quod maius est, in hoste etiam diligamus, quid mirum est, si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur? Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit benivolentiae magnitudo. Quam si qui putant ab inbecillitate proficisci, ut sit, per quem adsequatur, quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt. Quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum esse in se arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus; quod longe secus est. Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit, et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet, ita in amicitia expeten-

Pyrrhus
Annibal

Power of
honestie

Loue
confirm-
ed by
benefites

Base
out-
spryng
of
freend-
ship

Sp. Melius? With the two capiteins Pyrrhus and Hannibal, we foughte for the Empire in Italie. Notwithstanding from the one, we withdrewe not muche our heartes, for his honest name, & thother alwaies the citie hated for his crueltee. But if the power of honestie be so muche, that we loue the same, yea in those, whiche we neuer sawe, & more then that, we like it euen in our very enemies: what meruaile is it, if the hertes of men be moued, when thei seeme to behold the vertue and goodnesse of suche, with whom they may be ioigned in acquaintaunce. Although loue be fastened by pleasures receaued, by good will well tryed, and acquaintaunce had: all whiche thynges together when they bee laied to the same firste phantasie of mans mynd and loue, a certain wonderfull greatnesse of good will doeth kiendle. Whiche, if anie thinke it commeth of desire, to haue a helpe of staie, that it should be a meane, whereby euerie one should come by that he most desireth, truely they leaue vs a very base, and no gentlemanlie outspryng of frendship to be, which of lacke & nede would haue it to issue. But if this wer so, then as euery man felt in hym self smallest habillitee, so should he be most rediest to freendship: whiche thyng is farre otherwyse. For as euery man trusteth most to him self, & as euery man chiefly with vertue and wisdom, is so furnished, that he hath no nede of any other, & taketh all his owne thynges to lye in his own power: so he dooeth most excede all others in sekynge and honourynge freenshippe.

dis colendisque maxime excellit. Quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? Minime hercule! ac ne ego quidem illius; sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse non nulla, quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit benivolentiam consuetudo. Sed quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae. Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam (neque enim beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus), sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus. Ab his, qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt, longe dissentiunt, nec mirum; nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt, qui suas omnes cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. Quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi autem intelligamus naturae gigni sensum diligendi et benivolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis. Quam qui adpetiverunt, adplicant se et propius admovent, ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et moribus sintque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec inter eos sit

Africanus and Lælius had no need of another

Usury of pleasures

Fruit of Amitee

For what, had Affricanus any nede of me? No-
thyng at all truely, Nor I of him neither: but I, for
certein woonder I was in of his vertue, and he per-
chance agein for an opinion he had of my beha-
viour, loved me, and our daylie companie en-
creased our good will. But although manie and
great commoditees ensued thereof, yet did not the
cause of our lovyng one the other, come of any
hope of such thynges. For as we be profitable to
others and liberall, not of purpose to get thankes,
(for in deede we make no vsurie of our pleasures)
but euen of verie nature be geuen to liberalitee: so
doe we thinke, that we ought to couet freendship,
not led therto by hope of rewarde, but because all
the fruite thereof resteth in verie love self. We are
farre from the opinion of these, whiche after the
nature of brute beastes, dooe referre al thynges to
pleasure & sensualitie. And no meruail at al. For
they, whiche haue cast all their myndes, vpon so
vyle and so lothsome a thing, can haue no eye to
any heavenlye, to anie goodly, or godly thing.
Wherefore those maner of menne, we wil set a syde
from our talke, and let vs imagine and iudge, that
loues feelyng, and earnestnesse of good wil is en-
gendred of nature, by some profe of honestie de-
clared. Whiche honestie who that loue, doe applie
them selues to the same, and drawe neerer, that
they maie take the vse of the compaigny & maners
of him, whom they began to phantasie: and that
they maie be mates and a lyke in loue, readier to
doe pleasures than to require any. And let this bee

honesta certatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitias maximae capientur, et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab inbecillitate gravior et verior. Nam si utilitatis amicitias conglutina-
ret, eadem commutata dissolveret; sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt. Ortum quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte vultis.

Friendship beginning of nature

Fannius. Tu vero perge, Laeli; pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.

Scaevola. Recte tu quidem. Quam ob rem audiamus.

Laelius. Audite vero, optumi viri, ea, quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur. Quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat, quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere. Nam, vel ut non idem expediret, incidere saepe, vel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur; mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias aetate ingravescente. Atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga ponerentur; sin autem ad adulescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriae condicionis vel commodi aliquius, quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. Quod si qui longius in amicitia protracti essent, tamen saepe labefactari,

Continuance of friendship

an honest kynde of strife betweene freendes. And thus shall great commoditees be taken of freendship, & the beginning therof shal come of nature, rather then of neede, a beginnyng both weightier & trewer. For if profite shoulde fasten frendship, then the same beyng changed, shoulde vnlose it againe. But because nature cannot be chaunged, therefore true frendships be euerlasting.

☞ Thus the first begining of freendship you see, excepte peraduenture ye haue some thyng els to aske.

Fan. Naie Lælius, I praie you goe forth with your matter, & as for hym here, whiche is my younger, of mine own head I dare make answer.

Scæ. In deede you saie but wel, wherfore lette vs heare foorth.

Lælius. Hearken then my frendes these thynges, whiche many tymes and ofte haue been reasoned, betweene me & Scipio, concernyng freendshippe. He truely was woont to saie, there was nothyng more harde then freendship to continue vnto the last houre of death. For he woulde saie, it oft tymes hapned, that either it should not auaille both parties, to haue it continue still, or els that frendes woulde not be alwaies of one mynde, in the matters of the common wealth. He would saie also, that mennes maners dyd ofte chaunge, sometyme by reason of euill lucke, somtyme as age grewe on them. And of these thinges he would bryng an example by a similitude of boies state, whiche was, that the whotte love of children, was oft tymes caste vp with their chaunge of voyce. And in case they had continewed it, til thei became young men of full age: yet that frendship was broken sometyme, either by reason of stryfe, either by some maner of riote, either by some gain and profite, whiche bothe of them beyng frendes, coulde not atteigne to at once. So that if any had gone on, somewhat longer in freendship, yet they brake

si in honoris contentionem incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiiis quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae; ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstittisse. Magna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis, quod rectum non esset, postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam; quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab iis, quibus obsequi nollent. Illos autem, qui quidvis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos. Eorumque rela inveterata non modo familiaritates extinguere solere, sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna. Haec ita multa quasi fata inpendere amicitiiis, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae, sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri.

Quam ob rem id primum videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. Numne, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? num Vellinum amici regnum adpetentem, Maelium debuerunt iuvare? Tib. quidem Gracchum rem publicam vexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque a-

Couet-
ousnesse
in friend-
ship

Bondes
of love

Compo-
sition of
Coriola-
nus
Becilli-
nus

often tymes, if they fell in any contencion for honour or dignitee. For he would saie there was no sorer pestilence in freendship, then couetousnesse of moneie, whiche is in the moste part of menne, and strife about honor and glorie, which is in the beste sorte of men. Wher vpon great enmitee oft times groweth betwene right deare freendes. He further would say, that great variance, and many tymes iuste dyd spryng, when any thyng was required of freendes, that was not honest, as either that they should be instrumentes to others trecherie, or els helpers to dooe wronge. The whiche thyng suche as would refuse, although they should dooe honestlie in it, yet should they be reprobued of them, whose myndes they would not folow, as breakers of the lawe of freendship. But thei whiche had the face to require any thing, what so euer it were, of their freend, he was woont to saie, did by their very askyng professe, that for their freendes sake they would attempt all maner of thynges. And when suche mennes malice was once long growen and festered in hearte, not onely their acquaintance was wont to be geuen vp, but also great & continuall hatred grewe betwene theim. ¶ These many thynges so hang ouer freendshippe, euen as one should saie, by destinee, that he saied, to escape all these, he thoughte it to bee not onely a parte of wisdom, but also of very happinesse. Wherfore if ye be pleased, let vs firste seethis poinct, how farre oughte loue to stretch in freendship, as if Coriolanus hadde any freendes, whether they oughte to haue borne weapon with hym against their countreye: whether Becillinus freendes should haue ordered him in his enterprise for the kyngdome: whether Spu. Melius freendes shoulde haue holden with hym? We sawe Tiberius Gracchus, when he made an vpsturre in the common wealth, was forsaken of Quintus Tu-

micis derelictum videbamus. At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaevola, quom ad me, quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc, ut sibi ignoscerem, causam adferebat, quod tanti Tib. Gracchum fecisset, ut, quidquid ille vellet, sibi faciendum putaret. Tum ego:

‘Etiamne, si te in Capitolium facies ferre vellet?’ **Capitoll**

‘Numquam,’ inquit, ‘voluisset id quidem; sed si voluisset, paruissem.’ **Wicked
answere
of Blossi-
us**

Videtis, quam nefaria vox! Et hercule ita fecit vel plus etiam, quam dixit; non enim paruit ille Ti. Gracchi temeritati, sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem praebuit. Itaque hac amentia quaestione nova perterritus in Asiam profugit, ad hostes se contulit, poenas rei publicae graves iustasque persolvit. Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris. Quod si rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis, quidquid velint, vel inpetrare ab iis, quidquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res vitii; sed loquimur de iis amicis, qui ante oculos sunt, quos vidimus aut de quibus memoria accepimus, quos novit vita communis. Ex hoc

**Offence
in our
friends
behalf**

**Honeste
requestes**

bero and his companion frendes. But Caius Blossius the Cumaine, a geast of your familie Scæuola, when he came to me as a sewter, because I sate in counsaile with Lænas and Rutilius the Consules, alledged this cause for him self that I shoulde pardone hym, which was that he had Tiberius Graccus in suche a reuerence, that whatsoeur he willed, he thought it meete to be enterprised. Than quod I, what and this to, if he woulde haue had you set fyer on the Capitol? Naie quod he, he would neuer haue willed me to suche a thyng, but and if he had once bydde me, I must needes haue doen it. You see how shamefull a saiying this was, and in very deede so he did, yea & rather more than he saied. For he did not folowe Tiberius Graccus rashe- nesse, but was also a ryngleader to it, nor made not him self a compaignion of his furie, but a capitain. And therefore in this madnesse beyng afearde of a newe examinacion, he fled into Asia, and gat hym to our ennemies, & in the ende, suffered iuste and greuous punishement of our citie. There is therefore none excuse for the faulte, if a manne offende for his frendes sake, for seeyng the opinion of one's virtue is the breeder of frendship, it is hard for frendship to remain, if one swarue from vertue. But if we agree it to be honest, both to graunt to our frendes what so euer they woulde haue, & to obteigne of our frendes what so euer we desire: there truely we be of a through tried wisdom, if there can be no faulte found with the thing. But our speakyng is of these frendes that be in our iye daily, of suche as we see, or suche as we haue heard of, and our daily experience teacheth vs.

numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime, qui ad sapientiam proxime accedunt. Videmus Papum Aemilium Luscino familiarem fuisse (sic a patribus accepimus), bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum iis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium memoriae proditum est. Igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quippiam contendisse, quod contra fidem, contra ius iurandum, contra rem publicam esset. Nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid adtinet dicere, si contendisset, impetraturum non fuisse? cum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, aequae autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare. At vero Tib. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem C. frater nunc idem acerrimus.

P. Aemilius

C. Lucinius

M. Curius

T. Coruncanius

First law in friendship

Haec igitur lex in amicitia sancitur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae. Deflexit iam aliquantum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum. Tib. Gracchus reg-

Foul excuse

Oute of these sortes we muste take examples, and of them chiefly, who come nearest to wisdom. We know, that Paulus Aemilius was of much familiaritee with Caius Lucinius, as we haue heard of our fathers, and that they wer twice Consulles together, & felowes in office of the Censureshippe. And we reade also in stories, that in that time Marcus Curius and Titus Coruncanus were great freendes with them, and dearest one to thother also among them selues. Therefore we can not so muche as suspecte or deeme, that any of these would haue earnestly required any thing of their friend, that should haue been against their faith, against their othe, or against the common welth. For to what purpose were it, to say that these euils were in suche men? For if they had earnestlie required any thyng in that maner, I know thei could not haue obteigned, for as muche as these we spake of, were very godlie men. But let it be of a lyke euill to graunt, as to make an vn honest suite. Yet Caius Carbo consented to Tiberius Graccus, and so did C. Cato, who at that tyme was neuer awhit his brother Caius ennemy, but at this present is his earnest aduersarie. Let this then bee the firste lawe enacted in freendship, that neither we require vn honest thinges, nor beyng desired do any. For it is a fowle excuse, and in no wise to be alowed, when a man shall either in priuate fautes, other elles in fautes against the comon wealth confesse, he did it for his freendes sake. For we are nowe, O Fannius and Scæuola, sette in such place, that it behoueth vs longe afore to foresee the chaunces that maie happen to the comon wealth. For the old custome of our fathers al readie is somewhat swarued from hir course and race. Tiberius Graccus

num occupare conatus est, vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses. Num quid simile populus Romanus audierat aut viderat? Hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P. Scipione effecerint, sine lacrimis non queo dicere. Nam Carbonem, quocumque modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Tib, Gracchi sustinuimus; de C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid expectem, non lubet augurari, Serpit deinde res, quae proclivis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. Videtis, in tabella iam ante quantas sit facta labe, primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia. Videre iam videor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis arbitrio res maximas agi. Plures enim discent, quem ad modum haec fiant, quam quem ad modum iis resistatur. Quorsum haec? Quia sine sociis nemo quicquam tale conatur. Praecipendum est igitur bonis, ut, si in eius modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se alligatos, ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re publica peccantibus non discedant; in probis autem poena statuenda est, nec vero minor iis, qui secuti erunt alterum, quam iis, qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces. Quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle, quis potentior? qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute

Ambi-
cion of
Tiberius
Graccus

Gabini-
us law.
Cassius
law

went about to haue gotten the kyngdome & ruled as a king to, for certaine monethes, did euer the people of Rome heare or see the lyke? And his frendes & kinsfolke also after his death did folow the example of hym. What partes they plaied against P. Scipio Nasica, I can not without teares reporte. For as for Carbo, who we spake of earwhile, we did suffer and beare with, because of Tiberius Graccus new punishment. But what I looke to folowe of Tiberius Graccus Tribuneship, I luste not to prophecie, for from thence cometh al matiers, whiche be ready for mischief: & after they once beginne, they folowe headlong on. Ye see alreadie afore hand in the tables of the lawes, howe great a decaie hath happened, first by the lawe called Gabinia, and then within two yeres after, by the lawe called Cassia. And me thinkes I doe alreadie see the communaltee of Rome deuided from the Senate, and that the greatest matiers be ordered after the will of the people. For mo men shal learne howe suche thynges may be doen, then howe they maie be withstanded. But to what ende speake I all this? verely because no man goeth about any suche thyng without fellowship. The honest sort therfore muste bee warned, if vnwares they lyght by any aduenture in suche a kynde of freendshippe, that they thinke not them selues so bounde, but that thei mai forsake their freende, if in any great matter thei conspire against the commonwealth. And for naughty men a punishment must bee deuised, and no lesse for suche as folowe others, then for those whiche bee the verie capitaines and ryngeladers theym selues of all wickednesse.

Who was nobler, who was of more power in al Grece then Themistocles? who beyng capitayne in the warre againste the Persians, when he had

Graeciam liberavisset propterque invidiam in exilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit, quam ferre debuit, fecit idem, quod xx annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. His adiutor contra patriam inventus est nemo; itaque mortem sibi uterque conscivit. Quare talis in proborum consensio non modo excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est, sed potius supplicio omni vindicanda est, ut ne quis concessum putet amicum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi; quod quidem, ut res ire coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit. Mihi autem non minori curae est, qualis res publica post mortem meam futura, quam qualis hodie sit.

Punishment as due to the partners as rynge-leaders
Themistocles
Themistocles & Coriolanus slew themselves

☞ Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae, sancitur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogemur; studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit; consilium vero dare audeamus libere. Plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur. Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam (sed nihil est, quod illi non persequantur argutiis): partim fugiendas esse nimias

A good but a rare care
First rule of friendship
Preventing of honest requestes
Motions in friendship

deliuered Greece from bondage, and afterward was banished for enuie, coulde not beare the same enuie of his vnthankful country, which his part was to haue borne. He plaied the like part that Coriolanus did with vs twentie yeares agoe. These twayne found no ayde agaynste their countrey, & therfore they kylled themselves. Wherefore suche naughtie mennes conspiracie, is not to bee cloked with any excuse of frendship, but rather punished with all extremitie, that no manne maie thinke it lawefull to folowe his freende, that makes warre against his countreie. Whiche thyng (as the worlde beginneth to goe) I wote not whether one daie it will be so or not. But truely I for my parte, haue no lesse care, what the state of the common welth shalbe after my deathe, then what it is at this day. Let this therfore be agreed, and bee the fyrst rule of freendshippe, that we aske of our freendes thynges that be lawfull, and dooe for our freendes sakes thynges that be honest. And that we looke not vpon our freend till he desire vs, but that good wil be alwaies readie, and that slackenesse be not vsed. Let vs be glad in dede to geue faithfull counsaill. Let them be of great accompt in freendship, whiche counsaill well. And let vs geue them a rule ouer vs, to warne vs, not only plainely, but also if neade be, sharpely, and suche authoritie geuen must be obeied. For I suppose some wonderfull wonders pleased some of them, whom I heare saie were taken for wise in Greece. But there is nothing, but that thei can descant thereon with their quiditiues, as for example we shuld auoide

amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suam cuique rerum, alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas, cum velis, vel remittas; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiant unus pro pluribus. Alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius (quem locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi) praesidii adiumentique causa, non benivolentiae neque caritatis amicitias esse expetendas; itaque, ut quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias adpetere maxime; ex eo fieri, ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia querant quam viri et inopes quam opulenti et calamitosi quam ii, qui putentur beati. O praeclaram sapientiam! Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt, qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. Quae est enim ista securitas? Specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda. Neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. Quod si curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res

Few
friends

Taking
friend-
ship out
of the
world

We must
always
do well

freendship with to many, for that one man thereby must nedes be carefull for many, and that it is enough to doe, euery man to care for his owne. Also to be overmuch combred with other mennes mattiers (they saie) is vnweldie, and to haue the raines of freendshippe at length to plucke straiter or make slacker, as one will, they thynke it a pleasure. For they say quietnesse is the chiefe poincte of happines, which the minde can not enioye, if one muste beare the burdeine, or as it were, trauaile with childe for many. Another sort of them (thei saie) speake muche more beastelie yet then this, whiche place a littell aboue I briefly touched, and that was, that freendshippe ought to bee desired for an healpe and staies sake, & not for good will & fauour to anie body. And therfore as euery manne hath little staie, and little succour, so he shoulde the more seeke after freendship. And for this cause (they saie) it is, that women seeke more the helpe of freendship then men, and the poore more then the riche, and the wretched more then the fortunate.

☞ O gaye and goodlye wisdom. For they goe aboute to take the sonne out of the world, that would take freendship out of it, then the whiche we haue of God nothyng better, ne nothyng pleasaunter. For what maner of quietnesse is this? truely to see to, pleasaunt, but in verie deede at many tymes to be refused. For it is no reason, either not to take in hand or to leaue of beyng taken in hande, anie honest cause or deede, because thou wouldest not be troubled. But if we wil refuse paine, we must also refuse vertue, whiche must of necessitee with

sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit,
 ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia lubi-
 dinem, ignaviam fortitudo; itaque videas
 rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere,
 in bellibus fortes, flagitiosis modestos.
 Ergo hoc proprium est animi bene con-
 stituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere
 contrariis. Quam ob rem, si cadit in sapi-
 entem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit,
 nisi ex eius animo extirpatam humani-
 tatem arbitramur, quae causa est, cur
 amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne
 aliquas propter eam suscipiamus mo-
 lestias? Quid enim interest motu animi
 sublato non dico inter pecudem et homi-
 nem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut
 saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem?
 Neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui vir-
 tutem duram et quasi ferream esse quan-
 dam volunt; quae quidem est cum mul-
 tis in rebus, tum in amicitia tenera atque
 tractibilis, ut et bonis amici quasi dif-
 fundatur et incommodis contrahatur.
 Quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico
 saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet,
 ut tollat e vita amicitiam, non plus quam
 ut virtutes, quia non nullas curas et mo-
 lestias adferunt, repudientur.

Proper-
 tee of
 a well
 staide
 minde

He mea-
 neth the
 stoikes

☞ Cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut
 supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis e-
 luceat, ad quam se similis animus adpli-
 cet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor
 exoriatur necesse est. Quid enim tam ab-
 surdum quam delectari multis in animis

Where
 loue
 groweth

a certaine painfulnessse dispise & hate his contraries, as for example, the good must hate the euill, the chaste the lecherouse, the hardie the cowardly. Therfore you see the ryghte, moste of all greued with vnrightuousnesse, the mightie with the weakelynges, the honest with the shameles. This therfore is the propertie of a wel staied mind, to reioice at good thynges, & to be greued with the contraries. Wherfore if greefe of minde light in a wise man (as in veraie deede it doth) except we suppose the nature of man is cleane rooted vp out of his hert, what cause is there, that we shoulde vtterly bannysh frendship from the life of man, because we woulde suffer no troubles for it? For what difference is there, I saie not betwene a beast & a man, but euen betwene a man and a stone, or a dead stocke, or any suche like thing, if you take away the mouynges & modes of the mind? Neither are these to be herd, that wil nedes haue vertue to bee an harde thyng, and as it were like iron. Whiche trewly aswell in manie thynges, as also in freendship, is easie and gentle, so that at the good fortune of his freend it spreadeth it selfe abroad, and at his misfortune it shrinketh in again. Wherfore this grefe of minde, that is oftymes to be taken for freendes, is not so great as it ought to take awaie freendship among men: no more than vertue shoulde be refused, because it bringeth with it many cares & troubles of mind. But for asmuche as vertue knitteth freendship together (as I saied afore) if any sparke of vertue doe appeare, wherunto one of a like minde maie applie and ioyne it selfe, there loue must necessarily grow, when suche a thing hapneth. For what is so beastlie, as to be delited with these many kynde of vaine thynges, as

rebus, ut honore, ut gloria, ut aedificio,
 ut vestitu cultuque corporis, animante
 virtute praedito, eo qui vel amare vel, ut
 ita dicam, redamare possit, non admo-
 dum delectari? Nihil est enim remune-
 ratione benivolentiae, nihil vicissitudine
 studiorum officiorumque iucundius.
 Quid, si illud etiam addimus, quod rec-
 te addi potest, nihil esse, quod ad se rem
 ullam tam alliciat et attrahat quam ad
 amicitiam similitudo? concedetur pro-
 fecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant
 adsciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate
 conjunctos atque natura. Nihil est enim
 appetentius similium sui nec rapacius
 quam natura. Quamobrem hoc quidem,
 Fanniet Scaevola, constet, ut opinor, bo-
 nis inter bonos quasi necessariam beni-
 volentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura
 constitutus. Sed eadem bonitas etiam ad
 multitudinem pertinet. Non enim est
 inhumana virtus neque inmundis neque
 superba, quae etiam populos universos
 tueri eisque optime consulere soleat;
 quod non faceret profecto, si a caritate
 vulgi abhorreret. Atque etiam mihi qui-
 dem videntur, qui utilitatum causa fin-
 gunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum
 amicitiae tollere. Non enim tam utilis
 parta per amicum quam amici amor ip-
 se delectat, tumque illud fit, quod ab a-
 mico est profectum, iucundum, si cum
 studio est profectum; tantumque abest,

Beastli-
nesse

Requi-
tyng of
benefites

Cause
princi-
pall of
frend-
ship
Like wol
to like
Nature

Vertue

Profite

honour, glorie, buildyng, apparell, & deckeyng of the bodie, & not marueilously to be delighted, with suche a mind endewed with vertue, as bothe can loue and yelde loue for loue againe. For there is nothyng goodlier, then requityng of benefites, nor any thing pleasanter, than thenterchangeyng of loue and dutie. And also if you putte this vnto it, which maie wel be added that there is nothyng, whiche allureth and so draweth oughte vnto it, as lykenesse of condicions doeth one to freendship. This surely is graunted to be true, that the honest, loue the honest, & so haunt together, as men were ioigned by kinred and nature. For nothing more coueteth, or is more egar of his lyke, then nature. Wherfore this is plaine, O Fannie and Scæuola, in mine opinion, that the honest beare towarde the honest, a certain goodwill, as of course, whiche is apointed by nature, to bee the wellspryng of freendship. But this kynd of goodnesse also should appeere towarde the common sorte. For vertue is not chorlishe, nor emptie handed, nor yet loftie: but hir custome is to defend all men, & to doe the best for them she can. Whiche thyng vndoubtedlie she would not dooe, if she disdeigned the common sorte.

☞ Furthermore me thinketh those men, that for profites sake dissemble freendship, doe cleane take awai the louingest knot of freendship. For the veraie profite gotten by ones freend, doth not so muche like one, as his freendes very loue doth delite hym: and than is that, whiche commeth from a mans freend a pleasure, whan of good will & loue it proceadeth. And it is so beyonde reason, that

ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ii, qui opibus et copiis maximeque virtute, in qua plurimum est praesidii, minime alterius indigeant, liberallissimi sint et beneficentissimi. Atque haut sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. Ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est.

Profite
followeth
friendship

Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. Nam quis est, pro deorum fidem atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? Haec enim est tyrannorum vita nimirum, in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benivolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae. Quis enim aut eum diligat, quem metuat, aut eum, a quo se metui putet? Coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus. Quod si forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderunt, tum intellegitur, quam fuerint inopes amicorum. Quod Tarquinius dixisse ferunt exulantem, tum se intellexisse, quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum iam neutris gra-

A tyrants
lyfe

Loue &
feare

Aduersitie
trieth
friends

freendship should besought for necessitee, seeyng that those, whiche be endued with wealth, richesse and vertue chieffy, wherin most aide is, haue no neede of any other, & be most liberal and bounteous. And I know not, whether it be a meete thyng, that freendes shoulde neuer neade anie thyng: for where should our good will haue appeared, yf Scipio had neuer neaded, neuer fauour, neuer counsail, neuer our assistaunce, neither in peace nor in warre. Therfore freendship hunteth not after profite, but profite foloweth freendship. Men than that swimme in richesse, be not to be heard, if thei shall at any tyme dispute of freendship, in which nether by experience, nor by knowelage, they haue anie vnderstandyng. For who is there (in very sadnesse) that neither to loue any, neither to be loued again, would walow in all richesse, and liue with plentie of all thynges earthlie? For this kynd of lyfe is for tyrans, wherein there is no trustinesse, no loue, no hope of assured good will, but all thynges euermore suspected and cared for: nor there is no place of frendship. For who can loue one, whom he feareth: or elles loue one whom he dreadeth? Suche yet be honoured with feigned freendship onely for a time, that if thei happen to take a fall (as it doeth many times come to passe) than is it well perceyued, howe naked they be of freendes. Whiche thing the reporte goeth, Tarquinus the tyranne saied, at suche time as he was banished, that he well vnderstode, what freendes he had faithfull, and what vnfaithfull, nowe when

tiam referre posset. Quamquam miror, illa superbia et inportunitate si quemquam amicum habere potuit. Atque ut huius, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare non potuerunt, sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fideles. Non enim solum ipsa Fortuna caeca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos, quos complexa est; itaque effervuntur fere fastidio et contumacia, nec quicquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos, qui antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio, potestate, prosperis rebus inmutari, (sperni ab iis veteres amicitias, indulgere novis). Quid autem stultius quam, cum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quae parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa, amicos non parare, optumam et pulcherrimam vitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent, nesciunt, nec cuius causa laborant (eius enim est istorum quidque, qui vicit viribus), amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio; ut, etiamsi illa maneant, quae sunt quasi dona Fortunae, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. Sed haec hactenus.

☞ Constituendi autem sunt, qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligen-

Richesse
Fortune

A foole
fortunate

Freendes
the best
richesse

Geftes of
fortune

Bondes
of loue in
freend-
ship

he was hable to recompence neither of theim. And yet I meruail, if in that his pryde and loathsome condicions, he could possibilie haue any at all. And as this mannes maners, of whom we haue spoken, could not purchase any true frendes, so many mens riches, that be in high authoritie, do cleane shut out, as it were true freendship. For Fortune her selfe is not onely blynde, but maketh these also often tymes blynde, whom she moste embraceth. And therfore (for the moste parte) they are puffed vp with pryde and disdeigne, and nothing is so irksome, as a foole in good fortune. And this a man maie see, that such as before tymes wer of indifferent maners, by rule, power, and prosperitee, dooe chaunge and despise their olde frendes, and leane to newe. But what more foolish thing can be, than to studie, thei may be hable with great heapes & plentie, to gette other thynges that be sought for, as moneie, horses, seruantes, gaye cloathing, & costly plate, and yet not to seeke for frendes, being the best and goodlyest riches of this lyfe. For they knowe not for whom they get other thynges, when they are gotten, nor to whose vse thei trauaile. For euery one of these be his, whiche will win them with strong hande. But freendship once gotten, abydeth with euerie man stedfast and surely. And although these thynges continew, whiche be as one woulde saie, the giftes of fortune, yet a rude lyfe & destitute of frendes can not be pleasant. But here an ende of this mattier.

☞ And now we must set out, howe farre the boundes & pointes of loue doe reache in freendshippe, whereof I see there be three opinions, and

di. De quibus tres video sententias ferri, 3 opini-
quarum nullam probo, unam, ut eodem ons of
modo erga amicum adfecti simus, quo friend-
erga nosmet ipsos, alteram, ut nostra in ship dis-
amicos benivolentia illorum erga nos allowed
benivolentiae pariter aequaliterque re-
spondeat, tertiam, ut, quanti quisque se
ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis. Harum
trium sententiarum nulli prorsus ad-
sentior. Nec enim illa prima vera est, ut,
quemadmodum in se quisque sit, sic in
amicum sit animatus. Quam multa enim,
quae nostra causa numquam faceremus,
facimus causa amicorum! precari ab in-
digno, supplicare, tum acerbius in ali-
quem invehi insectarique vehementius,
quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste,
in amicorum fiunt honestissime; mul-
taeque res sunt, in quibus de suis com-
modis viri boni multa detrahunt detra-
hique patiuntur, ut iis amici potius
quam ipsi fruantur. Altera sententia est,
quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis
ac voluntatibus. Hoc quidem est nim-
is exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare
amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et
datorum. Divitior mihi et affluentior
videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare Trewe
restricta, ne plus reddat quam acceperit; friend-
neque enim verendum est, ne quid exci- ship
dat, aut ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne
plus aequo quid in amicitiam congera-
tur. Tertius vero ille finis deterrumus,
ut, quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti

I allow neither of them. One is, that we so loue our freend, as we doe our selfes. The other, that our good will towarde our freendes, doe a like and equallie answer theyr good will towarde vs. The thirde, that howe muche euery man setteth by him selfe, so muche he shoulde bee sette by of his freendes. But I agree to none of these three opinions. For the first is not trewe, that euery man, is a like herted towarde his freende, as he is towarde him selfe. For how many thynges enterprise we for our freendes sake, whiche for our selues we woulde neuer doe, as to praie and sue to an vnworthy man for our freendes cause: to be ouer earnestly bent against one, and to pursue him very sore: whiche thynges in our owne mattiers stande not well with honestie, but in our freendes causes bee moste honest. There be many thynges also, in whiche the honest sort, both take awaie and suffer to bee taken from theyr owne gaines, to thende their freendes rather than them selues, maie enioy them. The second opinion is, that appointeth freendship, to vse like benefites, and like good will, but this is to straight and to neere, to bryng freendship to be weied in balaunce, as though there ought to be a like iompe measure of taking & receiuyng of pleasures. Me thinketh trewe freendship is a richer and a bountifuller thyng, & doeth not take so narrowe heade to geue no more than it maie receiue. Neither is there suche feare to bee taken in freendship, that we lease not a good tourne, or let it fal in the mire, or that we heape not vp more benefites than iust measure. The thirde is the worst, which is, that how muche euery man maketh of him selfe,

fiat ab amicis. Saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae fortunae fractior. Non est igitur amici talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere, ut amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque in spem cogitationemque meliorem. Alius igitur finis verae amicitiae constituendus est, si prius, quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit, dixerō. Ne gebat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse repiriri quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus; nec vero se adduci posse, ut hoc, quem ad modum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem; impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit ei, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare, ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo plures det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum; rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angere, dolere, invidere. Quare hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet; illud potius praecipendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando od-

Asaiyng
most re-
pugnant
to friend-
ship

so muche he shoulde bee made of by his freende. But in some often tymes either there is a more bashful spirite, or a more comfortles hope of amending their state. It is not therefore the proprettee of a freende, to bee toward him, as he is toward himselfe, but he ought rather to studie and find the meanes, that he cheare vp his freendes dismaied minde, and bryng hym in a more hope and better comfort. There is therefore another ende of trewe freendship to be made, so that first I shall tell that whiche Scipio was wont chiefly to reprove. He wolde denie, that any sayng coulde be founde more againste freendshippe than this that saied, men ought so to love, as at sometyme they shoulde hate. And he could not be brought to beleue, that this was saied by Bias, as it was reported, who was one of the seuen wise men: but that it was the sayng of some vile and ambitious man, or els of one that woulde bryng all thynges to his owne power and swaie. For how can one be his freende, whose enemye he thinkes also to be. For first he must nedes desier and wish, that his freende might verie often offende, that he might geue as it were occasions to chide. Againe, he must needes be greued & fretted, or else enuie at his freendes good hap and doynges. Wherefore this rule truly were enough (whose so euer it be) to destroy frenship. But this rather were mete, to haue a rule made, that we should vse suche warenesse in prouidyng of freendes, that we shoulde not begin to loue hym, whom at anie tyme

isse possemus. Quin etiam, si minus felices in diligendo fuisset, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.

What is
to be at-
tributed
to honest
friends

His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut, etiamsi qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuuandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudine sequatur; est enim, quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit. Nec vero neglegenda est fama, nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium; quam blanditiis et adsentando colligere turpe est; virtus, quam sequitur caritas, minime repudienda est. Sed (saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia) querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent; capras et oves quot quisque haberet, dicere posse, amicos quot haberet, non posse dicere, et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis negligentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos, qui ad amicitias essent idonei, iudicarent. Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi; cuius generis est magna penuria. Et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum; expe-

A ques-
tion wor-
thy the
askyng

we might after hate. Besides, if we had not bene most fortunate in chosynge of our frendes, yet Scipio thought men shuld beare that mischaunce, rather than to seeke an occasion of fallyng out. These endes in freendeship therfore I thynke bee to bee vsed, that whan frendes maners be honest, all their goodes, counsaill, and good will, should be as comon among them, without any excepcion: and also if chaunce so come to passe, that the vn~honest doynges of frendes, bee to bee holpen in thynges, where they stande vpon lyfe & death, or vpon their estimacion, they maie somewhat swarue out of the waie, so that great dishonestie follow not of it. For freendship maie be pardoned herein. Neither is estimacion to be reiected. Nor yet muste we thinke, that the people's voice is a small helpe to haue a dooeyng in thynges, whiche to get with fflatterie & fayre woordes is dishonestie. Therfore vertue, who hath the loue of all men folowynge it, is not to bee dispised. But it was ofte demaunded (for now I returne to Scipio, al whose talke was of freendeshippe,) why in all other thynges men were more diligent, as that euerie one coulde tell how manie goates and sheepe he had of his owne. Yet coulde not numbre howe manie frendes he had: & that in compassynge the one he bestoweth a diligence, and in choosynge the other, he is negligent, and hath as it were, no certeigne signes & markes, by the whiche he should iudge who be fittest for freendeshippe. We must therfore choose sure, steadfast, & vnwaueryng frendes, of the whiche sorte, there is a greate skarsitie, and it is harde to knowe theim without a triall. But we muste make the try~all in freendeshyppe it selfe, for so freendeshippe goeth before our iudgement, and taketh awaie the

riendum autem est in ipsa amicitia. Ita praecurrit amicitia iudicium tollitque experiendi potestatem. Est igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benivolentiae, quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia ex aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. Quidam saepe in parva pecunia perspicuntur quam sint leves, quidam autem, quos parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna. Sin erunt aliqui reperi, qui pecuniam praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment, ubi eos invenimus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut, cum ex altera parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint? Inbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam; quam etiamsi neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. Itaque verae amicitiae difficilime reperiuntur in iis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur; ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo? Quid? haec ut omittam, quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates! ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendant. Quamquam Ennius recte: "Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur," tamen haec duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt

Waies to
proue
frendes

Money

Honour,
Rule,
Auctori-
tee

Frend-
ship
hardly
found
amonge
greate
men

Sure
frende

occasion of tryall. It is therefore a wyse mannes parte, so to staie the earnestnesse of his love, as he dooeth his race in renning, to thentent we maie so vse our frendship, as men that had assaied their horse, and somewhat tryed the maners of their freendes. Many men often tymes in a little moneie matter, be founde how vnconstant they be: there be other some again, whom when a little money can not attempt, by a great summe of money may be soone knowen. But if some maie be founde, whiche thinke it beastly to set moneie before frendship, where then shal we finde them, that dooe not sette honour, rule, auctoritie, and power, before frendship? that when these be set foorth on the one side, and the power of frendship on the other side, who is there, that wil not rather chose the firste then the laste? For man's nature is weake to refuse rule, which if men follow & little regarde frendship, they thinke thei are to be excused, because not without a great occasion, they haue broken of frendship. Therefore trew frendship is very hardly found in them, whiche liue in honour and rule. For where can you finde suche a one, as woulde preferre his freendes honour before his owne? But to leaue these, howe greuouse and dangerouse do most men thinke it, to be fel~lowes and partenars in miseries, wherto not one is easily founde, that wil be content to come, although Ennius saied well: The sure freende in thynges vn sure is knowen. Yet these two thynges make men for the most part to be noted of vnstedfastnesse and lightnesse, if either in their owne prosperitee they set their freendes light, or in their freendes

aut in malis deserunt. Qui igitur utraque in re gravem, constantem, stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene divino.

A feithful
frend

☞ Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est eius, quam in amicitia querimus, fides; nihil est enim stabile, quod infidum est. Simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est qui rebus isdem moveatur, eligi par est, quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem; neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum, neque vero, qui non isdem rebus movetur naturaque consentit, aut fidus aut stabilis potest esse. Addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis, quae pertinent omnia ad eam, quam iam dudum tracto, constantiam. Ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse. Est enim boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam; deinde non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum. Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haud-

How to
chose a
freende
Waue-
ryng
mynde
What
a frend
must
eschew

Good
men

Two
rules in
frend-
ship

Pleasant
talke

aduersitee they cast them of. Who therfore shall shewe him self in both these discrete, stedfast, and faithful in frendship, him oughte we to iudge of the perfectest kind of men, & in a maner as a god. For the grounde worke of that stedfastnesse and constancie, which we seke to be in frendship, is faithfulness. For nothyng is stedfast, that is vnfaithfull. Besides it is fitte we chose our frend simple, familiar, good to agre with, and one that will be moued with the same thinges, wherwith we be. All which thinges belong to the faithfulness that ought to be in frendship. For nether can he be faithful, that wil be in many mindes, or that hath a tournyng hed. Nor he stedfast and sure that is not of the same mode that his frend is, and agreable to his nature. Herevnto must be ioyned, that he which shalbe a frend, may not take plesure in accusing, nor lightly beleue accusations offred, which thinges belonge to that stedfastnesse, wherof earwhile I entreated. And so commeth it to be true, which in the beginning I said that frendship can not be but betwene good men. For it is the propertee of a good man (whom we may also call wise) to keepe these twoo rewles in frendship.

☞ First, that nothyng be feigned nor dissembled: for it is more honeste openlie to hate, than in countenance to cloke. Next, that not onely he cleere his frend of faultes, whereof he is charged by any other, but also that he him self in no wise be suspicious, or thinke his frend hath doen any thyng amisse. There must be besydes this, a certein pleasantnesse in ones talke and facions, which is not

quaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.

Sageness

☞ Existit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis, num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus. Indigna homine dubitatio! Non enim debent esse amicitiarum sicut aliarum rerum satietates; veterrima quaeque, ut ea vina, quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debet suavissima; verumque illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit. Novitates autem si spem adferunt, ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda; maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Quin ipso equo, cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res impediat, nemo est, quin eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur quam intractato et novo. Nec vero in hoc, quod est animal, sed in iis etiam quae sunt in anima, consuetudo valet, quomodo locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis, etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus.

Whether
newe
or old
friends
are to
be pre-
ferred
Prouerb

Simili-
tude

Custome
Chiefe
point in
friend-
ship

☞ Sed maximum est in amicitia parem

one of the worst sauces for freendship, but sower-
nesse and solemnesse must in no wise be had, yet
sadnesse & sagesse in all matters haue in it surely
a certein grauitee. But freendshippe ought to be
somewhat more at large, more free & pleasant, and
to all feloweship & gentlenes more disposed.

☞ And here riseth a very hard question, whether
our newe freendes worthy of frendship, be to be
preferred before our olde, as we vse to esteme yong
horses more than olde. A doubt surely ynsemely for
men, for of freendship as there is of other thynges,
ought there to be no gluttynge. And our oldest kinde
of thynges like good old wines, ought to be most re-
garded. And that is a trewe saied saw, whiche co-
monly is saied, that we muste eat manie busshelles
of salte togeather, with whom we shall perfourme
the partes of freendship. Yet new acquaintaunces
be not to be refused, if there be any hope in theim,
as in good trees where appeareth fruite. And yet
olde acquaintance must be kept in his dewe place.
For in olde freendes, and acquaintance, and cus-
tome is no small trust.

☞ And as to the horse, wherof we made mencion
erwhile, if nothyng lette, there's none, but had ra-
ther vse him, whom he hath vsed than a new and
ynhandled. Neither doth custome muche onelie
in liuyng thynges, but also in thynges lackyng
life. For euen with hillie places & wooddy coun-
treis be we delited, wherin we haue dwelled longe.
But it is a chiefe point in freendship the higher

esse inferiori. Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis, Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is antebat aetate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnes per se posse esse ampliores volebat. Quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut si quam praestantiam virtutis, ingenii, fortunae consecuti sint, impertiant ea suis communificentque cum proximis, ut, si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant inbecilliore vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati. Ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerunt, cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores, quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt. Quod est multo profecto magis in veris patribus certisque faciendum. Fructus enim ingenii et virtutis omnisque praestantiae tum maximus capitur, cum in proximum quemque confertur.

The elder in honour preferred.

Mutual behaviour of friends

☞ Utigitur ii, qui sunt in amicitiae conjunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari.

to bee equall with the lower. For often tymes there bee certeine graces in it, as was in Scipio towarde our company of fřendes, he neuer put hym selfe fforth before Philus, before Rutilius, before Mummius, or any of his baser fřendes. But he honoured Quintus Maximus his brother, as his better, because he was his elder, who was surely a notable man, yet nothyng like him, and he was desirouse, that al his fřendes might be made richer by hym. Whiche all men muste bothe dooe and ffolowe, that if they gette anie betternesse of vertue, witte, or ffortune, they should parte it among their fřendes & part it with their kinsefōlkes, as if they be borne of a low stocke, orels haue their kynred either in witte or substaunce woorse then theim selfes, they shoulde enlarge their richesse, and bee as an honoure and glorie to their state, as we reade in the playes of some, that were in seruauntes states, by reason their birth and stocke was vnknownen, but after they were perceiued, & ffounde eyther Gods sonnes, or kyngs children, yet they bare still a loue toward the sheapherdes, whom they toke manie yeres as their fāthers. Whiche thyng we ought much rather do toward our true and well knownen fāthers. For thence chieffy is the fruites of ones witte, vertue, and all honestie taken, when it is bestowed on hym that is neerest alied. Therfōre as those whiche in fřendeshippe be the betters in degree, ought to equall theim selues with their inferiours, so ought inferiours, not to be greeued, if either in witte, either ffortune, either worship, their fřendes doe excede theim. Of the which the

Quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant, eoque magis, si habere se putant, quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo factum queant dicere. Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobrantium; quae meminisse debetis, in quem conlata sunt, non commemorare, qui contulit. Quam ob rem, ut ii, qui superiores sunt, summittere se debent in amicitia, sic quodam modo inferiores extollere. Sunt nim quidam, qui molestas amicitias faciunt, cum ipsi se contemni putant; quod non fere contingit nisi iis, qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur; qui hac opinione non modo verbis, sed etiam opere levandi sunt. Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam quantum ille, quem diliges atque adiuves, sustinere. Non enim neque tu possis, quamvis excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere, ut Scipio P. Rupilius potuit consulem efficere, fratrem eius L. non potuit. Quod si etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen, quid ille possit sustinere.

☞ Omnino amicitiae conroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingeniis et aetatibus iudicandae sunt, nec, si qui ineunte aetate venandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios, quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. Isto enim

Vpbrai-
des of
plesures

Howe
much
is to be
done for
frendes
Scipio
made
Rutilius
Consull
Freende-
ship in
ages and
wittes
Compa-
nions of
youth

moste part eyther plaine them selves of somewhat, or els vpbraide men with their benefites, and so muche the more if they thinke they haue ought, whiche they can proue to haue be done either dew~tifully, or freendely, or by any of their trauaile. But surely these vpbraiders of pleasures, be an hateful kinde of people. Whiche pleasures he only, on whom thei be bestowed, ought to remember, and not he that dyd bestow them. Wherfore as the better man must abase him selfe in freendeship, so after a sort the better muste preferre the inferior. For there be some whiche make freendeship veray yrkesome, where as they thinke them selves not regarded. Whiche happeneth almoste to none but suche as thinke them selves worthy to be dispised. Who must both by woordes and deades bee brought from this opinion. You muste dooe for euery one first so much as your selfe can do. Next so muche as he is hable to discharge, whom you loue & would furthre. For you can not bring all your frendes to high honour, although you be farre aboue other. As Scipio was hable to make Publius Rutilius Consull, but he coulde neuer make his brother Lucius. And if you bee hable to prefer one to what you lust, yet most you take heede, what he is hable to discharge. And we must alwaies thinke frendship to be in full growen ages and well stayed wittes. Nor those, whiche in their boistate, haue heen desirous of hunting & tenesse, muste of necessitee take them their frendes, whom they loued and delighted than with their plesure.

modo nutrices et paedagogi iure vetus- **Unlike**
 tatis plurimum benivolentiae postula- **manners**
 bunt; qui neglegendi quidem non sunt,
 sed alio quodam modo aestimandi. Ali-
 ter amicitiae stabiles permanere non pos-
 sunt. Dispares enim mores, disparia stu-
 dia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo
 dissociat amicitias; nec ob aliam causam
 ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis
 amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta
 est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse,
 morum studiorumque distantia. Recte **Inordi-**
 etiam praecipi potest in amicitias, ne in- **nate love**
 temperata quaedam benivolentia, quod **in friend-**
 persaepe fit, impediatur magnas utilitates **ship**
 amicorum. Nec enim, ut ad fabulas re-
 deam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere po-
 tuisset, si Lycomedem, apud quem erat
 educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum
 impedientem audire voluisset. Et saepe
 incidunt magnae res, ut discidendum **Friends**
 sit ab amicis; quas qui impedire vult, **ought to**
 quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et **ponder**
 infirmus est mollisque natura et ob eam **requestes**
 ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus.
 Atque in omni re considerandum est, et
 quid postules ab amico et quid patiari a
 te impetrari.
 ☞ Est etiam quaedam calamitas in **Common**
 amicitias dimittendis non numquam **peoples**
 necessaria; iam enim a sapientium fam- **friend-**
 iliaritatibus ad vulgares amicitias oratio **ship.**
 nostra delabitur. Erumpunt saepe vitia

For so shal nursses and youthmaisters challenge muche frendship, by reason of olde right, who in dede be not to bee dispised, but yet after some other sorte to be esteemed. For els frendship can not continue stedfast. Vnlyke maners haue vnlyke studies, whose vnlykenesse of condicions doeth breake of all frendship. And for none other cause the good with the wicked, and the wicked with the good can not bee freendes: but for that there is betwene them so great difference, as the greatest may be of maners and affections. It maie be also a good lesson in frendship, that no man hinder his frendes profite, through vnmeasurable loue towarde him, as it often happeneth. For to come to fables. If Neoptolemus would haue heard Lycomedes, with whom he was brought vp, whan he wolde haue staied his iourney with muche weepynge, he could neuer haue taken Troie. And oftentimes there chaunceth waighty matters, why a man must depart from his frendes: the whiche who so euer wolde let or trouble, because he can not beare well his absence, is to bee compted a weakelyng and cockney natured: and therefore vnreasonable for frendship. And in all thynges we must take heade, both what we aske of our frende, and what we suffer to be obteyned of vs. There happeneth also many times, as it were a certaine necessarie lamentacion for the partyng of frendship, for now our talke tourneth from sage mens to the common peoples frendship. Oftentimes frendes faulter

amicorum tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. Tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae et, ut Catonem dicere audiui, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis inuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit, ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque faciunda sit. Sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit (loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium, sed de communibus amicitiiis), cavendum erit, ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. Nihil est enim turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere, quocum familiariter vixeris. Ab amicitia Q. Pompei meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem, quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello; utrumque egit graviter, auctoritate et offensione animi non acerba. Quem ob rem primum danda opera est, ne qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut extinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae videantur. Cavendum vero, ne etiam in graves inimicitias convertant se amicitiae; ex quibus iurgia, maledicta, contumeliae gignuntur. Quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt, et hic honos

Wari-
nesse to
be ysed
in frend-
ship

Dishon-
estie

Scipios
aliena-
cion
from two
of his
frendes

Redresse
of vicis
in frend-
ship

burst out, partly vpon freendes, and partely vpon
straungers, yet the shame redownes to theyr
freendes. Suche sort of freendship therfore muste
bee eased with leauyng of companie, and as I haue
hearde Cato saie, muste bee vnhaunted, rather than
hastily broken of, except some vnbeareable iniurie
shall fier it out, as a thyng neither comly, neither
honest, neither fit to be, without a present change
& a seuerance. But if ther shal be a certaine chaunge
in their maners and likynges, as some tyme there
happeneth, or some variance shall fall about some
part of the common welth (for I spake as I saied a
little afore not of wisemens but comon freende-
ship) a warinesse is to be vsed, least freendship
seeme not only to be left of: but malice also to be
bredde. For nothyng is more dishonest, than to be
at warre with hym, with whom thou hast freendly
liued. Scipio for my sake (as you knowe) had se-
uered hym selfe from Quintus Pompeius freend-
ship. For the discencion that was in the comon
welth, he was also withdrawen clene from our fel-
low in office Metellus. Both these he did sageli
with auctoritie, & no great griefe of minde. Where-
fore we must first take heade, that dissencion hap-
pen not amonge freendes, and that their freendship
seeme rather cast of, than oppressed. Also we must
beware, that great frendshippes turne not in to
great hatredes: wherof chidynges, tauntynge, &
euill reportes do rise, whiche yet be to be borne, if
any waie they be sufferable. And here is the honor
of old freendship to be geuen, that the fault alwaies

veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit, qui faciat, non, qui patiatur iniuriam.

☞ Omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis citio diligere incipiant neve non dignos. Digni autem sunt amicitia, quibus in ipsis inest causa, cur diligentur. Rarum genus. Et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec quicquam difficilius quam reperire, quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum. Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quicquam bonum norunt, nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos. Ita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. Ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se sibi quisque carus est. Quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus numquam reperietur; est enim is, qui est tamquam alter idem. Quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucris, nantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, fēris, primum ut se ipsae diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur), deinde ut requirant atque adpetant, ad quas se adplicent eiusdem generis animantis, idque

Who be
worthy
of frend-
ship

Beastes

Who is a
freende

Com-
parison
betwene
beastes
& men
Unfrend-
ly re-
quest

bee in the doer, and not in the sufferer of wronge. There is one counsaile, and ease for al these vices and discommoditees, and that is, that we love not ouer soone, nor loue the vnworthy. They be worthy of frendship, in whose selfe there is a cause why they should be beloued. It is a rare kinde, and so surely all worthy thynges be rare, yea and nothyng harder than to finde a thyng in his kynde through perfite. But the most part of men in worldly thynges will knowlage nothyng good, but that is profitable, & lyke beastes thei loue those freendes chieffy, of whom thei hope thei shall receiue moste profite. Therefore they want that fairest and naturallest frendship, whiche is to be sought euen by it selfe & for it selfes sake: neither do thei shew vnto them selfes any token or example of the strength of this frendship, what and how muche it is. For euerie man loueth hym selfe not as though he woulde chalenge of him selfe a reward for his loue, but because euerie man of nature is dearest to hym selfe, which kinde of loue and dearenesse who so doeth not vse it in frendship, shall neuer bee founde a trew and faithfull frende. For he surely is a frend, that is an other I. That if it appeare in beastes, in foules, in cattell, in fish, in swine, & wilde sauage, first that they loue them selfes, (for that propertie is geuen to euerie liuyng thyng from the first birth) and next that they couet and lust after some other beastes of their kynd, with whom they

fāciunt cum disiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani, quanto id magis in homine fit natura! qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit, cuius animum ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus.

☞ Sed plerique perverse, ne dicam impudenter, habere talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse, non possunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab iis desiderant. Par est autem primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. In talibus ea, quam iam dudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest, cum homines benivolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus iis, quibus ceteri serviunt, imperabunt, deinde aequitate iustitiaeque gaudebunt, omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet, neque quicquam umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit, neque solum colent inter se ac diligunt, sed etiam verebuntur. Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam. Itaque in iis perniciosus est error, qui existimant lubricum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam; virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea, quae summa sunt, pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera pervenerit. Quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est

A freend
must be
a good
man

Honest
bashful-
nesse in
freend-
ship
Freend-
ship an
aide to
vertue
Veraie
fēlou-
ship

maie be conuersaunt, & that thei do with a desire, and certein likenesse to mans loue: howe muche the more is it by nature in man, who bothe loueth hym selfe, and gettes hym a nother, with whom he maie breake his mind, as though of two he wold make almost one. But the moste sort of men euen frowardlie, (I will not saie shamefully) would haue suche a freend as thei themselves cannot be, & those thynges, whiche they doe not to their freendes, they yet them selves will craue of them, But it is firste mete, that one be good himself, and then seke after for his like: for in suche, that kynd of steadfast freendship, whiche I treated of earwhile, may be surelie settled, when men ioigned together with good wil, wil first rule those affections, which others doe serue, and then take a pleasure in vprightnesse and iustice, and the one will take in hand all thynges for the other, and one will not require of an other, any thing but that is honest and lawfull, and thei wyll not onely agree and loue together, but they will also stand in a shamly awe of eche other. For he that taketh awaie honest bashefulnes from freendship, dooeth take awaie freendshippes chiefe beautie. Therefore in those men is a verie daungerous error, whiche thynke that by freendship, a gate is set open to all luste & vice. For freendship is geuen by nature as an ayde to virtue, and not as a guide to vice, to the extent that seeyng vertue can not achieue alone to the chiefe thynges, she should come as it were in arme and accompanied with a nother, whiche kynde of fellowship if either it be, either hath been, or shall be amongst any,

habendus ad summum naturae bonum
 optimum beatissimusque comitatus.
 Haec est, inquam, societas, in qua om-
 nia insunt, quae putant homines expe-
 tenda, honestas, gloria, tranquillitas a-
 nimi atque iucunditas, ut et, cum haec
 adsint, beata vita sit et sine his esse non
 possit. Quod cum optimum maxu-
 mumque sit, si id volumus adipisci,
 virtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec a-
 micitiam neque ullam rem expetendam
 consequi possumus; ea vero neglecta qui
 se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se de-
 nique errasse sentiunt, cum eos gravis
 aliquis casus experiri cogit. Quocirca
 (dicendum est enim saepius), cum iudi-
 caris, diligere oportet, non, cum dilexe-
 ris, iudicare. Sed cum multis in rebus
 negligentia plectimur, tum maxime in
 amicis et diligendis et colendis; praepo-
 teris enim utimur consiliis et acta agi-
 mus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio.
 Nam implicati ultro et citro vel usu diu-
 turno vel etiam officiis repente in medio
 cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione
 disrumpimus.

¶ Quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei
 maxime necessariae tanta incuria. Una
 est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de
 cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consenti-
 unt. Quamquam a multis virtus ipsa
 contemnitur et venditatio quaedam at-
 que ostentatio esse dicitur; multi divitias
 despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis
 victus cultusque delectat; honores vero,

Happie
 life
 Vertue

Witty
 sentence

Prouerb

Reche-
 lesnesse
 in frend-
 ship
 Profite
 of frend-
 ship
 Richesse
 Promo-
 cions

they must be saied best & luckiest accompaigned,
for the atteignyng of natures chiefe happinesse. For
this is (I say) the verie fellowship, wherein all
thynges be, which men thinke to be wisshed after,
as honestie, glorie, quietnes, & pleasure of mynde,
so that where these be, there is the happy life, and
without these it can not be. The whiche life seeyng
it is the best and chiefest thyng, we must geue
our mind to vertue, if we will obtaine it, with out
whiche neither freendship, nor any thing els to be
desired we can attaine to. And surely where vertue
is dispised, those whiche thynke thei haue freen-
des, doe than feale they were deceyued, whan anie
weighty aduenture doth driue theym to make a
tryall. Wherefore when you haue iudged of your
freende, you must loue, and not when you haue
loued, than iudge. Yea & this had neade yet oftner
to be tolde you. But where as in many thynges we
be muche punisshed for negligence, yet most of
all in louyng and regardyng of our freendes. For
we vse oftentimes the cleane contrary counsaile,
and euen forbidden we doe and vndoe, as the olde
prouerbe saieth. For when we bee toste hither and
thither, either by daiely compaignie, or else by
some kinde of dutee sodeinly in the middes of our
course we burst of our freendship, whan there
ryseth anie little offence. Wherefore suche a care-
lesnesse of so necessarie a thyng, is the rather to
be dispised. For freendship is the onely thyng in
the worlde, of whose profite all men with open
mouthes do agree of, although vertue selfe of many
is vnsetby: and is saied to be a certein outbragge
or outshewe. Many also regarde not riches, who
beeyng content with a little, right homely fare and
homely apparrayle pleaseth them. Promocions

quorum cupiditate quidam inflam-
 mantur, quam multi ita contempnunt, ut
 nihil inanius, nihil esse levius existi-
 ment! itemque cetera, quae quibusdam
 admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt qui
 pro nihilo putent; de amicitia omnes ad
 unum idem sentiunt, et ii, qui ad rem
 publicam se contulerunt, et ii, qui rerum
 cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ii,
 qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi, pos-
 tremo ii, qui se totus tradiderunt volup-
 tatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam,
 si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter
 vivere. Serpit enim nescio quo modo per
 omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam aetatis
 degendae rationem patitur esse exper-
 tem sui. Quin etiam si quis asperitate ea
 est et inmanitate naturae, congressus ut
 hominum fūgiat atque oderit, qualem
 fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem ac-
 cepimus, tamen is pati non possit, ut non
 anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat
 virus acerbitalis suae. Atque hoc maxi-
 me iudicaretur, si quid talle posset con-
 tingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac homi-
 num frequentia tolleret et in solitudine
 uspiam collocaret atque ibi suppeditans
 omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat,
 abundantiam et copiam hominis omni-
 no aspiciendi potestatem eriperet. Quis
 tam esset fēreus, qui eam vitam fēre
 posset, cuiqui non auferret fructum vo-
 luptatum omnium solitudo? Verum er-
 go illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta,

Friend-
 ship
 crepeth
 through
 all kinde
 of life
 Timon of
 Athenes

Solitari-
 nesse

Archita

also, with the desire wherof many be sette a fyre, a great sort dooe so little esteeme, that they thinke nothyng vayner nor lighter. Also other thinges, whiche some euen wonder at, very manie esteeme them as nothyng. Of freendship all men haue one opinion, both those, whiche haue geuen them selves to meddle with the common welth, & those who be delited with the knowelage & learnyng of thinges, and those which quietly tend their owne businesse, and finallie those, which geue them selves ouer whollye to folowe pleasures, thinke there is no life without freendshippe, if it so be they will liue somewhat honestlie.

☞ For freendship I wote nothow creapeth through al kind of liues, and wil suffer no part of a mans life that is ledde to want hir. So if there be any, of that sowernes and grimnes of nature, that he ffieth and hateth the compaignie of felowship of men, of the whiche sort we haue heard saie, one of the Tymons of Athenes was, but whiche of them I knowe not, yet he culd not abide, but must nedes seke after one, to whom he mighte vomite vp euen the bitternessse of his gaule. And this chieffy woulde be iudged, if any such thyng mighte happen, that God would take vs out of this prease of men, and would set vs some where in a wildernessse, and geeuyng vs there store and plentie of all thinges, whiche nature desireth, would take from vs the libertie of seeyng any man at all, who wer there so stonie herted, that could abide that kind of lyfe? And from whom woulde not solitarinesse take the fruicte of all pleasures? Therefore that is true, which I trowe I haue hearde oure elders tell, was wont to be fathered on Archita the Tarentine, and

ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audiui ab aliis senibus auditum: 'si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore; quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset.' Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur; quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.

Nature
loveth no
solitari-
nesse

☞ Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret, quid velit, anquirat, desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ea, quae ab ea monemur, audimus. Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae, multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est; una illa sublevanda offensio est, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benivole fiunt. Sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit: 'Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.' Molesta veritas, siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxuma autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio inpellitur. Omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia

Chid-
yng in
freend-
ship
Familiar
because
he ysed
to rede
his
bookes.
South-
ing flat-
tery
Flattery

so they heard saie of other olde men, that is, if any man shold climb to heauen once, and thoroughlie beeholde the nature of the worlde, & the beautiefulnesse of the sterres: it woulde be an vnpleasaunte woonder vnto him, whiche would haue been a most pleasant meruaile, if he had anie, with whom he mighte haue commoned thereof. So Nature (wee see) loueth no solytarienesse, and alwaies hangeth vpon another, as vpon a staie, which euen amongst the friendliest kind of men is had for most delight. But where as the same nature declareth by so many signes, what she meaneth and seketh, what she coueteth and desireth, yet I can not tell howe we ware deafe, and here not those thinges, wherof we be warned by her. For diuerse & many waies the vse of friendship serueth, and many occasions of suspiciouse offences be geuen, whiche somtime to shonne, somtyme to ease, & somtyme to beare them, is a wise mans part. And this one maner of offence is to bee auoided, that bothe the profite, & faithfulnessse of friendship may be kept still. For oftentimes we muste both warne, yea and chide our frendes to. And the same is to be taken friendly when it is done of good will. But I know not howe it cometh to passe to be trew, that my familiar Terence saied in his comoedy Andria, that sowthyng getteth frendes & truth doth purchase hatred. Truth is noisome, if there grow hatrede of it, which is a poison to friendship, but yet sowthing is much more hurtfull, whiche cokereth vp his frende, in his faultes, and suffereth him to renne still on hedde. But there is great blame in him, that careth not for the truth, & mucche fault in hym, that for disceite is geuen to sowthyng. Herein therfore we must haue all our regarde and

est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat; in obsequio autem, quoniam Terentiano verbo lubenter utimur, comitas adsit, adsentatio, vitiorum adiutrix, procul amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur. Cuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est. Scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: 'melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri quam eos amicos, qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos numquam.' Atque illud absurdum, quod ii, qui monentur, eam molestiam, quam debent capere, non capiunt, eam capiunt, quam debent vacare, peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt; quod contra oportebat, delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

✎ Ut igitur et moneri proprium est verae amicitiae et alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est nullam in amicitiiis pestem esse maiorem quam adulationem, blanditiam, adsentationem; quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium ad voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem. Cum autem omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est (tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat), tum amicitiae

Treweth
is to be
herd

A tried
saw of
Catoes

To to
foolish a
thyng

Propre-
tee of
trewe

frend-
ship

Greatest
pesti-
lence in
frend-
ship

Dissim-
ulacion
in frend-
ship

warinesse, that our warnynges be without bitter-
nesse, and our chidynges with out spitefulnesse:
but in sowthing (because I delight to vse Terence
worde) let there be an honest likyng, and let ffat-
tery the egger on of vice be sette aloufe, whiche not
onely for a freende, but for no honest man is meete.
For men lyue after one sort with a tyranne, & after
an other sorte with a freende: but his good daies
be to be dispaired of, whose eares be so shutte vp
from the trewth, that he will not heare it of his
freend. For it is a tried saw of Catoes, that earnest
foes deserue muche more pleasure of some, then
those that seeme to be fawnyng freendes. For they
sometyme, but these neuer tell the truth. And this
is to foolish, that those, who be warned of their
freendes be not agreaued at that they ought, but at
that they ought not. For they be not sorry they did
anuffe, but they take it vnkyndly that be chidden,
wher as contrary wyse thei shoulde bee sorry for
their fault, and gladde of the chidyng. As then to
warne oure freende, & to be warned againe, is the
propertee of trew freendship, and to do the one
honestlie, and not spitefully, and to take thother
gentilly, and not frowardly, so must we thinke,
there is no greater pestilence in freendship than
ffattery, faire speach and sowthyng, howe be it for
many causes, this may be noted the fault of light
and subtile persons, whiche speake all to pleasure,
but nothyng to truth. But wheras dissimulacion
is euill in all thynges (for it keapeth a man from
iudgyng the truth) yet most of all it is contrary to

repugnat maxime; delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius, commutabilis, multiplex? Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium quam animus eius, qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam multum atque nutum convertitur?

Ende of
friend-
ship

‘Negat quis, nego; ait, aio; postremo imperavi egomet mihi

Omnia adsentari,’


ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona, quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est. Multi autem Gnathonum similes cum sint loco, fortuna, fama superiores, horum est adsentatio molesta, cum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas. Secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. Contio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen iudicare solet, quid intersit inter popularem, id est adsentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem, severum et gravem. Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat in auris contionis, cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis! Dissuasimus nos; sed nihil de me, de Scipione dicam lubentius. Quanta illa, di immortales,

Gnato
the para-
site

Flattery
very
hurtfull

Caius Pa-
pyrius

freendeship, for it taketh away all trueth in word, without the whiche the very name of freendship can not continew. For seeyng the power of frendship is in a man to none other ende, but that of two mindes there shold be made one, how can it be brought to passe, if in one man there be not one and a like minde alwaies, but a diuerse, a wauering, and a changeable. For what thing can be made so variable, so out of course, as his mynd, whiche not only turneth at every mans phantasie and pleasure, but also at euery mans becke and looke? saie ye nay? and nay saie I, saie ye yea? and yea say I: and to be plaine, I haue euen appointed with my selfe to holde vp all thynges with yea and naie, as the same Terence saieth. But this Terence speaketh in Gnatoes person, whiche kynde of speakyng to make in a freende, were to to muche lightnesse. But wher as there be many lyke these Gnatoes, and in place, riches, and estimacion aboue others, their kynde of flattery is very hurtfull, when auctoritee is ioigned with their vanitee. But a flatteryng freende may be aswell discerned & knowen from a trew freend by takyng good heade as all counterfait & feigned thynges may be tried out from trew and right thynges. The assemble of the commons of a citee, whiche standeth moste of vnskilfull persons, is wont yet to iudge, what difference is betwene a people pleaser, that is a flatterer, & a curri-fauour, and a constant, a sage, and a discrete citesin. With the whiche kind of flatteries Caius Papyrius consull stuffed a late the peoples eares, whan he woulde haue made a law for the restoryng of the Tribunes for the commons. We persuaded the contrary, but I will saie nothyng of my selfe, of Scipio I wil speake gladly. Good lord, howe pithy was he that

fuit gravitas, quanta in oratione maiestas! ut facile ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceret. Sed adfuitis, et est in manibus oratio. Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. Atque, ut ad me redeam, meministis, Q. Maxumo, fratre Scipionis, et L. Mancino consulibus quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C. Licini Crassi videbatur! cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur; atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo. Tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium nobis defendentibus facile vincebat. Atque id actum est praetore me quinquennio ante, quam consul sum factus; ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa est.  Quodsi in scaena, id est in contione, in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si modoid patefactum et inlustratum est, quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur? in qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari, cum, id quam vere fiat, ignores. Quamquam ista adsentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest nisi ei, qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur. Ita fit, ut is adsentatoribus patefaciat aures suas maxime, qui ipse sibi adsentetur et se maxime ipse delectet. Omnino est amans

Pithy
oration
of Scipio

daie, how great a maiestie was in his talke, that you might well haue called hym the leader of the people, and not a felowe commoner. But what neade I to speake muche herof, ye were present, & the oracion is in euery mans hande. And by that meanes the lawe, for the gettingyng of the peoples fauour, by the voices of the people selfe was dasshed.

☞ And that I maie returne to the matter, you remembre, when Q. Maximus Scipioes brother, and L. Mancinus were Consuls, howe the lawe of C. Lycinius Crassus, concernyng the Priestes dignities, was thoughte to be fauell seekyng of the commons. For the choyce of colledges was turned to the peoples benefit. And he first made this ordre, to dele more truely with the common people. Yet the religion of the euer liuyng goddes (we defendyng it by our aunswere) did soone ouercome his oracion, which was euen a thyng peincted for sale woorke, & was doen when I was Pretor five yeare beefore I was Consull. Therfore that cause was defended, rather of it selfe, than by auctoritee of the speaker.

☞ But if in stage plaies, wher in many feigned & resembled matters be vsed, trueth is regarded, so that it be sette out and declared: what must it be in frendship, which hanges all on trewth? In the whiche, except you know (as thei saie) a mans hert to the bottome, & you show likewise yours, there is no trust nor trial in it, and surely you can not loue nor be loued, when you knowe not how trewly it is mente. Although this flattery be hurtfull, yet can it not hinder none but him, that geues eare to it, & is delited with it. And so it cometh to passe, that he openeth his eares to flatterers, whiche fflattereth and beste lyketh him selfe. Vertue alwaies

sui virtus; optume enim se ipsa novit, quamque amabilis sit, intellegit. Ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor, sed de virtutis opinione. Virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt. Hos delectat adsentatio, his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant. Nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter verum audire non vult, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. Nec parasitorum in comoediis adsentatio faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi.

‘Magnas vero agere gratias Thais mihi?’ Satis erat respondere: ‘magnas’; ‘ingentes’, inquit. Semper auget adsentior id, quod is, cuius ad voluntatem, dicitur, vult esse magnum. Quam ob rem, quamquam blanda ista vanitas apud eos valet, qui ipsi illam adlectant et invitant, tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animadvertant, ne callida adsentatione capiantur. Aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors; callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet, studiose cavendum est; nec enim facillime agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam adversando saepe adsentetur et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is, qui inlusus sit, plus vidisse videatur. Quid autem

Flatterer
herkneeth
flatterers

Vertue

Feigned
friend-
ship

In Enu-
cho Te-
rence co-
moedy

Flattery
maketh
much of
a little

Snares
of subtil
flattery

loueth her selfe. For she best knoweth her selfe, and perceiueth how she is to beloued. But I speake not now of vertue, but of the opinion which men haue of vertue. For with vertue selfe so manie bee not as woulde seeme to be indewed. These sorte of menne flatterie delighteth, when feigned comunicacion is put forth to please them, and they thinke that kynde of vayne talke to be a witnesse of their prayes.

☞ This therefore is no trewe frendshippe, when the one will heare no trewth, & the other is readie to lye. Neither woulde the clawyng of these trencher frendes, which be parasites, seeme feate and pleasaunt in comedies, excepte there were myxte therein some glorious souldiours, whiche bee Thrasoes, as for example saieth Thraso: Did Thais my woman geue me greate thanks. It had been enough for Gnato the Parasite to haue aunswared, Ye sir great, but he sayed, ye sir exceedyng greate thanks. Flatterie alwayes settes a thyng to the moste, whiche he woulde haue seme great, for whose pleasure it is spoken. Wherefore although this kynd of fawnyng vanitie, is muche esteemed with them, whiche embrace and like it them selves, yet the sager and constanter sorte of menne must be warned, that thei take hede, they be not snared with subtle flatterie. For euery man can see an open flatterer, except he be a very sotte. But we must diligently beware, leaste the subtill and secrete flatterer wynde himself in with vs. For he cannot easily be knownen. Because even with contrariyng of one oftentimes he flattereth, and feignyng that he chideth, he is fayre spoken, and at length he yeldes and suffers himself to be ouercome, that he that is disceued maie thinke he hath gotte a great victorie. But what is more dishonestie then to be

turpius quam inludi? Quod ut ne acci-
dat, magis cavendum est.

‘Ut me hodie ante omnes comicos stul-
tos senes

Versaris atque inlusseris lautissime.’

Haec enim etiam in fābulis stultissima
persona est improvidorum et credulo-
rum senum. Sed nescio quo pacto ab
amicitiis perfectorum hominum, id est
sapientium (de hac dico sapientia, quae
videtur in hominem cadere posse), ad le-
ves amicitias defluxit oratio. Quam ob
rem ad illa prima redeamus eaque ipsa
concludamus aliquando.

☞ Virtus, virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et
tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et con-
servat. In ea est enim convenientia rerum,
in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia; quae cum
se extulit et ostendit suum lumen et idem
aspexit adgnovitque in alio, ad id se ad-
movet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in
altero est; ex quo exardescit sive amor
sive amicitia; utrumque enim dictum est
ab amando; amare autem nihil est aliud
nisi eum ipsum diligere, quem ames,
nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita;
quae tamen ipsa ecflorescit ex amicitia,
etiamsi tu eam minus secutus sis. Hac nos
adulescentes benivolentia senes illos, L.
Paulum, M. Catonem, C. Galum, P. Na-
sicam, Ti. Gracchum, Scipionis nostri
socerum, dileximus, haec etiam magis
elucet inter aequales, ut inter me et Sci-
pionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp.

Conclu-
sion of
the mat-
tier

Vertue

To loue
what it is

skorned? And therefore we must vse the more diligence. that it maie not hap, as in a plaie named the Epicure. To day before all my old dotyng foolish freendes, you tost me goodly, and mocked me gaily: for in plaies olde mens persons without forecast and beyng light of beliefe, be the most foolish. But I can not tell by what meanes from the freendship of perfite and wise men (I meane in suche wisdome as is supposed may be in man) our comunicacion is turned to slight and slender freendship. Wherefore let vs come again to the firste we spake of, and let vs conclude at length vpon it.

☞ I saie vertue, O. C. Fannius & Q. Mutius, both getteth and keepeth freendes. For in it is all agreement, all stedfastnesse, and all constancie: Whiche when she aduaunceth her self, and sheweth out hir light, and bothe seeth and knoweth the same in another, she geueth hir selfe to that to, and takes likewyse that she findeth in a nother. Wherevpon loue and louyng frendship toward eche other, is enkendled. For both these two woordes have their names of this woord, to loue. But to loue is nothyng elles, but to beare good wil toward hym, whom you loue, not for anie neede or profite that is sought. Whiche profite flourisheth yet of freendshippe, although you the lesse nothyng folow it. With this kynde of good will, we when we were young menne, dyd loue Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallus, Publius Nasica, Tiberius Gracchus, our Scipioes father in lawe. This freendshippe also doeth more appeare among suche as be lyke of ages, as betweene me and Scipio, Lucius Furius,

Mummiū. Vicissim autem senes in ad-
 ulescentium caritate adquiescimus, ut
 in vestra, ut in Q. Tuberonis; equidem
 etiam admodum adulescentis P. Rutili,
 A. Vergini familiaritate delector. Quoni-
 amque ita ratio comparata est vitae na-
 turaeque nostrae, ut alia ex alia aetas or-
 iatur, maxime quidem optandum est,
 ut cum aequalibus possis, quibuscum **diuynſ**
 tamquam e carceribus emissus sis, cum **with**
 isdem ad calcem, ut dicitur, pervenire. **lyke**
 Sed quoniam res humanae fragiles ca-
 ducaeque sunt, semper aliqui anquiren-
 di sunt, quos diligamus et a quibus dili-
 gamur; caritate enim benivolentiaque
 sublata omnis est e vita sublata iucundi-
 tas. Mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est **Scipio**
 subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque vi- **beyng**
 vet; virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae **deade**
 extincta non est; nec mihi soli versatur **liued yet**
 ante oculos, qui illam semper in mani- **with**
 bus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara et **Laelius**
 insignis. Nemo umquam animo aut spe
 maiora suscipiet, qui sibi non illius me-
 moriam atque imaginem proponendam
 putet. Equidem ex omnibus rebus, quas
 mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil
 habeo, quod cum amicitia Scipionis pos-
 sim comparare. In hac mihi de re pub-
 lica consensus, in hac rerum privatarum
 consilium, in eadem requies plena ob-
 lectationis fuit. Numquam illum ne mi-
 nima quidem re offendi, quod quidem

**The im-
 age and
 memory
 of Scipio
 Scipioes
 friend-
 ship**

Publius Rutilius, and Spurius Mummius. And we old men also do take pleasure in young mennes loue towardes vs, as you see, I am delited in yours, and in Quintus Tuberos, beyng a very young man, and in P. Rutilius Virginius compaignie. And seeyng an order is so appoincted in our lyfe and nature, that one age maie spryng of a nother, chiefly we shoulde desire, that we might liue with our like in ages, that euen as we came to gither with them in our swadlyng cloutes, so we might kepe them compaignie to the windyng sheete. But because this worldlie substaunce is brickle and fadyng, we alwaies prouide some, whom we mai loue, and of them be loued againe. For if loue & frendship be taken from man, all pleasure of lyfe is taken awaie. Scipio surely although he was taken awaie sodeinly from this life, liveth yet with me, and shall live euer. For I alwaies loued the vertue of that man, whiche is not deade with me, neither standeth it daiely alone before myne eye, who alwaies haue had it in sight, but also to our childrens children shall it be noble and notable. No man shall euer enterprise greater thynges with hope and courage, whiche hath not thimage and memory of him before his eies. Truely of all the thynges whiche fortune or nature gaue me, I haue nothyng to matche with Scipioes freendship. In it was my conferece for the common wealth: in it was my counsaile for priuate causes: In it was my rest full of all delite. And I neuer offended him in any thing that euer I could perceiue, and I neuer

senserim, nihil audiui ex eo ipse, quod nollem; una domus erat, idem victus,isque communis, neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes. Nam quid ego de studiis dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi? in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus. Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem. Sed nec illa extincta sunt alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea, et, si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen adfert mihi aetas ipsa solacium. Diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum. Omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiamsi magna sunt.

☞ Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem. Vos autem hortor, ut ita virtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.

herd any thyng of hym that I was against. We had one howse, one diet, and that euen common; yea not that onely, but warfare, and also our iorneis and goyng abrode were a like common. But what shall I speake of our studies in serchyng alwaies and learnyng of somewhat, in the which we bestowed all our leasure and tyme, whan we were out of the sight of men. The remembraunce & onthynkyng of the which thynges, if with hym thei had died, I coulde by no meanes haue borne the lacke of so freendly and louyng a man. But those nother be dead yet, but rather nourished and increased by the onthynkyng and remembraunce of theim. And although I shold wholly be bereft of them, yet myne age self wolde bryng my greatest comfort. For I could not very longe continew in this state. And all short griefes be sufferable, although they be great. These thynges be they, whiche I had to speake of freendship. And I doe

exhort you that you so esteame vertue,

(with out which freend
ship can not bee possible) as sauynge it,
ye thinke nothyng
better than
freendship.



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